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Abstract 
Since the end of World War II, development aid has become a permanent 
fixture of U.S. foreign policy.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has been the primary organization for implementing the 
American government’s development policies.  Because of this, USAID provides an 
excellent lens for viewing the historical trajectory of American development aid.   
USAID’s experience in Rwanda demonstrates the broad policy shifts that define this 
historical trajectory.  During the 1960s, modernization theory directed development 
projects.  In the 1970s this shifted to a needs‐based mandate, and during the 1980s 
market liberalization programs defined USAID’s objectives.  The rich relationship 
between USAID and Rwanda exemplifies the gap existing in development aid 
between ideology and practicality.  Development aid’s value in determining foreign 
policy has also been underappreciated by scholars, and the comprehensive review 
of USAID projects provided aims to contribute to resolving these shortcomings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Rwanda received tremendous international attention during the 1990s as a 
result of its civil war and genocide.  The media, politicians, and scholars highlighted 
many different aspects of the genocide, including the role played by development 
and foreign aid in the intensification of ethnic animosities.  International relations 
scholar Michael Barnett has lamented that “post‐1995 histories of Rwanda have two 
defining characteristics.  One, they’re written from the vantage point of the 
genocide.  Second, they’re written with an eye to correct what are seen as 
misconceptions of the country’s history.”1  By criticizing scholars for narrowing 
their understanding to one crucial event, Barnett has identified a major shortcoming 
in the growing literature on Rwanda.  While analysis of the genocide is necessary, 
Rwanda’s history is not teleological; it does not lead only to the genocide.   
By examining the history of U.S. aid to Rwanda, a discussion of Rwanda’s 
history can begin without the genocide looming in the foreground.  By focusing on 
USAID’s role from 1962 through the 1980s, the shifts in foreign aid can be identified 
as moving from modernization practices to addressing basic human needs and 
ending with market reform policies.  This approach reveals on the one hand the 
general ideological movement of U.S. foreign aid policy, but it can also be seen that 
Rwanda programs reflected the local realities of implementing aid and did not 
simply toe the Washington line.  As Rwanda was remote and rather unimportant 
strategically, aid managers had some latitude for creative programming specific to 
Rwandan needs.  The effects of this distance can most clearly be recognized in the 
                                                        
1 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2002), 49. 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programs of the 1980s when old programming policies addressing basic human 
needs lingered in Rwanda after the ideological winds had changed in Washington. 
This thesis focuses on United States’ involvement in Rwandan development 
and examines what changes affected USAID’s position and objectives during the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  Although the emergence of development assistance is 
quite recent, aid has already become a permanent fixture in foreign policy programs 
across the globe.  As countries like the United States continue to fund aid projects it 
is important to understand their origins, influences and recipients.  By analyzing 
past projects, scholars are able to determine if aid has been effective and make 
recommendations about worthwhile assistance.  Finally, conclusions on the value of 
aid will lead to educated policy recommendations to improve assistance programs 
of the future.  Anthropologist James Ferguson critically explains the importance of 
development as a central value of our time saying “wars are fought and coups are 
launched in its name.  Entire systems of government and philosophy are evaluated 
according to their ability to promote it.”2  Beyond studying the role of aid in donor 
countries, the history of development assistance also illuminates changes in 
recipient countries.  Many countries, including Rwanda, are still recently 
independent and recognizing the role Western nations played since colonialism is 
crucial in understanding how these nations function today.   
Three sub‐questions will be considered to help examine the role USAID 
played in Rwanda’s development.  First, what were the specific projects undertaken 
by USAID in Rwanda during these decades?  Second, how did the goals and 
                                                        
2 James Ferguson, The Anti­Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), xiii. 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characteristics of these projects change over time?  Lastly, did events in Rwanda 
lead to changes in USAID projects or were changes driven by developments in U.S. 
foreign policy?  Research on Rwandan history, U.S. policy, and the USAID archives 
reveal major economic, political, and social events globally and within both 
countries that influenced USAID’s evolving objectives in each decade. 
During the 1960s, President Kennedy created USAID in accordance with his 
mission to promote development as a means of winning Cold War allies.  
Modernization theorists believed that lesser developed regions could be more 
susceptible to communism,3 providing the U.S. reason to supply aid to third world 
countries.  Another motivation for supplying aid to the developing world was 
humanitarian, such as responses to natural disasters and famine.  Kennedy worked 
to distance aid programs from U.S. diplomacy, as he saw Eisenhower’s past 
programs as shortsighted and too narrowly focused on strategic purposes.  
Kennedy’s work combining the acquisition of allies and focusing on humanitarian 
development projects, including education and health, allowed USAID to move away 
from development missions of the past.   
At the same time, Rwanda followed the tide sweeping across Africa and 
declared independence from Belgium.  Beginning in the late 1950s, African nations 
rejected their colonial ties and declared independence.  The majority of African 
countries gained independence during the 1960s.  Both the creation of USAID and 
                                                        
3 Works on modernization theory include: W.W Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
Non­Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Nils Gilman, Mandarins 
of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003); and Michael Latham, Modernization as ideology: American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  
4 
 
Rwandan independence set up the long‐standing development relationship between 
the United States and Rwanda.  This also set in place the trajectory of U.S. foreign aid 
beginning with modernization practices.  
Two key events distinguished aid policy in the 1970s from that of the 1960s.  
In 1973 the United States Congress enacted the New Directions Mandate to refocus 
foreign aid on the poorest of the poor.  New internal pressures within America, 
including lobbies originating from the civil rights movement and the end of the 
Vietnam War, forced Congress to rethink and refocus foreign aid.  This 
Congressional mandate occurred the same year that a military coup made Juvenal 
Habyarimana Rwanda’s president.  Habyarimana replaced Grégoire Kayibanda, the 
president since Rwanda gained independence.  These two changes expanded the 
established relationship of foreign assistance between the United States and 
Rwanda and shifted U.S. foreign policy objectives from modernization to a needs 
mandate.  
Finally, during the 1980s, the U.S. witnessed a political shift to the right with 
the election of President Ronald Reagan and another shift in the trajectory of U.S. 
foreign aid from the 1970s needs mandate to a liberalization focus.  With a 
Republican in office, the U.S. put a new emphasis on free market forces.  This focus 
on economic reform programs, specifically market liberalization, worked to 
complement President Reagan’s platform of increased security and targeting lesser‐
developed regions to boost stability and democracy.  Though programs in the 1960s 
worked to establish basic economic polices for the newly independent nations, the 
projects of the 1980s reflected an understanding based on a different ideology of the 
5 
 
specific economic needs of individual countries.  Modernization practices of the 
1960s involved state direction while 1980s liberalization stressed state retraction.  
These new programs worked on privatization and diversification of products.  Even 
though Reagan shifted USAID’s emphasis in Rwanda to market reform, Rwanda’s 
economy began rapidly declining and eventually collapsed.  The global economic 
downturn along with internal problems during the 1980s led to a decline in prices 
for Rwanda’s top commodities and severely damaged the country’s economy.  The 
tumbling market for coffee and tea, Rwanda’s major exports, and disastrous weather 
conditions destroyed these cash crops. 
Through an examination of USAID documents, it becomes clear that ideology 
sets the decades apart along with major economic, political, and social events that 
shifted USAID’s development objectives in Rwanda during each of the three decades 
studied.  The “development concept can be located in historical conjunctures and 
can be understood in relation to intellectual trends, shifts in global economic 
structures, political exigencies, and institutional dynamics.”4  Analyzing the full 
range of USAID’s work in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this thesis.  But, the USAID 
documents that comprise the primary source base for this research – including 
interviews with USAID employees, and regular reports such as budget submissions, 
country development strategies, action plans, project updates and special 
evaluations available at USAID’s online archive, the Development Experience 
Clearinghouse (DEC) – do reveal the motivations and influences behind the 
organization’s work in Rwanda.  It is these influences, and not the project’s results, 
                                                        
4 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, International Development and the Social Sciences, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 29. 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that are the primary focus of this thesis.  Supporting materials include works on the 
United States foreign policy, Rwandan history, and the history of development aid.  
Along with an examination of USAID’s work in Rwanda, an overview of the 
historiography of development aid is needed to understand the historical 
interpretations of aid since the 1960s.   
 
As more countries include development aid permanently in their foreign aid 
policy portfolios, the history of development becomes more pertinent.  The history 
of international development is still an emerging topic, and while political scientists 
and economists have long written analyses of aid, historical works are still relatively 
few.  Scholars from different fields generally agree that aid is the 
voluntary transfer of public resources from one government to another 
government, international organization, or non‐governmental organization 
(including not‐for‐profit organizations working on specific issues, public 
interest organizations, churches and their associated organizations, 
universities, foundations, even private, for‐profit business enterprises) to 
improve the lives and livelihoods in the country receiving the aid, among 
other goals.5 
 
USAID has commissioned historical reviews for its own internal purposes, but the 
organization has attracted the attention of few other historians.  
Historical literature on development aid has largely emerged only in the last 
two decades.  One historical examination of foreign aid can be found in the 2003 
special issue of Contemporary European History dedicated to Europe’s “first 
development decade” during the 1960s.  The issue includes historical case studies 
                                                        
5 Carol Lancaster, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty­First 
Century, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, the Global Economy and Development: Monograph 
Series on Globalization, 2005), 6. 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on the aid portfolios of the United Kingdom, France, Norway, and the Netherlands.  
These articles expand the historiography of official aid programs and provide a 
complementary view to the origins of the United States’ development program.  
According to Heide‐Irene Schmidt and Helge Pharo, “historical analysis may help to 
uncover the continuities and discontinuities in the evolution and implementation of 
development strategies.”6  This case study of USAID in Rwanda similarly focuses on 
continuities and discontinuities in aid type and implementation over three decades.  
Examining the factors and influences that created and shaped other governments’ 
aid programs elucidate the unique and specific events that led to the formation and 
development of the United States’ aid program.  For the U.S., domestic and 
international factors determined the type of aid provided, distinguishing them from 
other donor nations.  
Modernization has attracted particular historical attention.  Nils Gilman’s 
Mandarins of the Future examines the intellectual history of modernization theory, 
including W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth.  Gilman argues that while 
the theory focused on the plight of the third world, it also looked at the unfolding 
sentiments in America about the condition of modernity at home.  Gilman 
contextualized modernization theory while examining “the image of postcoloniality 
that undergirded the theory,” and compared works by modernization theorists that 
debated the definition of modernity.7  Gilman’s works is important in identifying 
contributors to the creation of America’s development policies.  Michael Latham’s 
                                                        
6 Heide‐Irene Schmidt and Helge Pharo, “Introduction,” Contemporary European History 12 
(2003), 393‐394.   
7 Gilman, 4. 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Modernization as Ideology argues that modernization “was also a means of 
understanding the process of global change and identifying ways the U.S. could 
accelerate, channel, and direct [development].”8  By examining the ideological 
background and effects of modernization theory, Latham’s work opens new areas 
for inquiry about national identity, specifically American identity, and the impact of 
the Cold War on foreign policies. 9  
David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission describes how U.S. “perceptions 
motivated and then shaped actual modernization policy and activity.”10  Focusing on 
projects implemented in Asia, Ekbladh argues that “understanding how 
development was brought to bear in the international arena by the U.S.” allows for 
“indispensable insight into the history of a powerful international theme and 
provides critical perspective on how it relates to the world today.”11  Ekbladh was 
particularly concerned with how modernization fit into the wider sense of America’s 
development mission.  Ekbladh’s work provides useful background information and 
supports the argument that there were many factors that influenced U.S. 
development policy.  And though Nick Cullather’s The Hungry World began as a 
                                                        
8 Latham, 2.  
9 Other works consider development outside the U.S. policy framework. Amy Staples’ The 
Birth of Development examines the creation of the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the World Health Organization. While not specifically focusing on the United States, 
this work advances the historiography of development studies useful in contextualizing U.S. foreign 
aid programs. Similarly, the volume International Development and the Social Sciences edited by 
historian Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, works to understand the production, transmission, 
and implementation of development thought within historical and political contexts.  
10 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 11.  
11 Ekbladh, 13. 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study on food and agriculture, specifically the 1960s Green Revolution,12 it grew 
into an examination of U.S. development, such as nation building, humanitarian 
relief, and foreign aid that also adds much to the discussion of U.S. development aid.  
There is also a wide range of works by economists and political scientists on 
the topic of development aid.  One of the leading development theorists on the 
history of America’s aid program is Carol Lancaster, the Dean and Professor of 
Politics in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.  She has written 
extensively on U.S. aid, using her background in the State Department and USAID to 
help explain past development policies and make recommendations for the future.13  
According to Lancaster, “books that come out regularly about aid rarely look at U.S. 
aid,” making her extensive list of contributions invaluable to the field of both 
developmental history and history of U.S. foreign aid.14   
Another scholar contributing to the historiography of U.S. aid is Samuel Hale 
Butterfield, a development officer from 1958 to 1980, who later taught theory and 
practice of international development.  His work, U.S. Development Aid, an Historic 
First, is an extensive look at the achievements and failures of U.S. aid in the 
twentieth century and serves as a continuation of U.S. Development Assistance Policy, 
a 1996 book by Vernon Ruttan, an agricultural economist who worked with USAID 
                                                        
12 According to Cullather, the Green Revolution was the wave of development activity that 
peaked in the 1950s and 1960s.  
13 Works on foreign aid by Carol Lancaster include Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little 
Done, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance 
in the Twenty­First Century, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000; Organizing 
U.S.  Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty­First Century, with Ann Van Duson, 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2005; Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007; George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? 
Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2008; “Redesigning Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs 79 
(2000), 74‐88.   
14 Lancaster, Transforming Foreign Aid, vii. 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and taught international development.  Butterfield and Ruttan provide models for 
examining America’s foreign aid history in specific cases, such as Rwanda.  
While there are some worthwhile general studies of U.S. foreign assistance, 
the historical literature lacks specific cases studies.  Anthropologists have therefore 
influenced our understanding of the local effects of development.  James Ferguson’s 
work is a prime example, as he chose to place his study in Lesotho, taking his 
primary focus as the development apparatus.  He argues that development 
institutions create their own form of discourse, constructing countries “as a 
particular kind of object of knowledge and a structure of knowledge around that 
object.”15  These arguments, by Ferguson and other anthropologists contribute to 
the study of development: its history, purpose and scholarship.   
There are no works by historians on USAID’s history in Rwanda, though the 
United States has a long relationship of providing assistance to the country.  The 
most pertinent volume comes from Peter Uvin, a political scientist and author of 
Aiding Violence.  Uvin’s work is very useful in examining development aid’s impact 
on the Rwandan genocide, but does not focus on one specific donor and relies 
primarily on evidence from the 1980s.  A work focusing solely on USAID in Rwanda 
spanning all three decades from independence to the civil war is lacking.  The aim of 
this thesis is to fill that gap and contribute to the growing body of work on both 
USAID history and development aid in Rwanda.   
 
                                                        
15 Ferguson, xiv. 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 This thesis has three main chapters. The first examines the major events in 
America and Rwanda in the 1960s that affected USAID objectives, especially 
Rwanda’s declaration of independence, the creation of USAID in the United States 
and the establishment of development assistance between the two countries.  The 
second chapter examines the 1970s, which began in Rwanda with a military coup 
that put Juvenal Habyarimana in power and witnessed the New Directions Mandate 
in the United States reorienting aid toward poverty alleviation and away from 
modernization and growth.  Finally, in the 1980s, the focus of chapter three, the 
shifts that impacted USAID in Rwanda the decade before violence broke out are 
examined.  These shifts include declining economic conditions in Rwanda that led to 
an economic collapse and the election of President Reagan in the U.S., which 
resulted in new market‐friendly aid policies.  The conclusion briefly considers 
Rwanda during the 1990s, especially the impact of the 1990 civil war and the end of 
the Cold War.  It continues on to provide a more complete picture of how USAID 
continued to evolve in Rwanda.  
These chapters support the argument that economic, social and political 
shifts in the United States and Rwanda affected the type of aid implemented in 
Rwanda from 1962 through the 1980s.  Examining Rwanda’s development history 
without highlighting the 1994 genocide contributes to the deficient body of 
literature without a determinist perspective leading to genocide.  Because Rwanda 
has been used both as a symbol of Western success and failure, as model of 
development and a warning sign, a reinterpretation of Rwanda’s history is needed 
to understand the importance of development aid and the impact of USAID.
 
 
Chapter 1: The Decade of Development 
  Rwanda, bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Burundi in Central East Africa, is slightly smaller than the state of Maryland, but 
its 2011 population of over 11 million makes it the most densely populated African 
nation.  There are three main ethnic groups that comprise Rwanda but relations 
among the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa have not always been clearly defined.  
Anthropologist Johan Pottier explained that “for the period up to 1860, it was 
correct to say that historians knew next to nothing about how the terms ‘Twa,’ 
‘Hutu,’ and ‘Tutsi’ were used in social discourse.”1  The terms have been explained as 
alternately racial, cultural, economic, and social designations.  During the 
reconstruction of Rwanda after the genocide, all citizens were to be referred to as 
“Rwandan” to help overcome the violence and discrimination of the past.  While this 
change may help for the future, it does not help clarify the past.  There have been 
many debates between scholars on the origins and distinctions of these groups.  
Revisiting these debates from pre‐independent Rwanda can clarify development 
objectives during the 1960s. 
  It is widely accepted that Tutsis migrated to the region of Rwanda 
supposedly while fleeing drought and famine in Ethiopia in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.  The Tutsis were pastoralist; owning cattle, a coveted resource, 
made them economically superior to the existing groups in Rwanda, including the 
agriculturalist Hutus, who had migrated to fertile Rwanda from Central Africa 
                                                        
1 Johan Pottier, Re­Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late 
Twentieth Century, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12‐13. Work by historian Jan 
Vansina has helped clarify many misconceptions and unknowns of Rwanda before 1900. 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during the wider Bantu migrations between the fifth and eleventh centuries.  Both 
groups intruded upon the original inhabitants of the area, the Twa.  This small 
group, comprising approximately one percent of Rwanda’s population today, were 
generally artisans and hunters.2   
While most scholars accept this timeline, it remains uncertain when the 
different groups entered the region.  Historian Jan Vansina explained, “there never 
were [definitive] successive immigrations of Twa foragers, Hutu farmers, and Tutsi 
herders… [T]he settlement history of Rwanda is actually very ancient and quite 
complex.”3  Regardless of origin, these three groups had integrated almost 
completely by the time European explorers entered the region.  For centuries “they 
spoke the same language, believed in the same god, shared the same culture, 
belonged to joint clans, and lived side by side throughout the country.”4  While these 
three groups had largely integrated by the mid‐nineteenth century, the Abazungu,5 
or white people, disrupted the equilibrium and exacerbated the preexisting tensions 
of these ethnic and social groups.  
  The Abazungu colonialists divided and conquered Africa during the 1880s.  
In Rwanda the original German colonialists – and Belgians after 1916 – comprised 
no more than one percent of the population, but held all the wealth and power.  The 
colonial powers enforced indirect rule, making “social relationships in Rwanda 
more uniform and exploitative than ever, with a clear hierarchy from Bazungu to 
                                                        
2 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (West Hartford: 
Kumarian Press, 1998), 14. 
3 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, (Madison: the 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 198.  
4 Uvin, 14.   
5 The term is Kinyarwandan. Bazungu is the Swahili term for white people. 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Tutsi to Hutu to Twa.”  A new hierarchy from Europeans at top to the Twa at bottom 
rested on an “ideology of racial superiority.”6  
  As Germany’s colonial control increased, Rwanda experienced internal 
conflicts.  The traditional Rwandan dynasty witnessed a violent succession battle 
following the death of the last leader, Mwami (King) Kigeli IV Rwabugiri.  The 
combined results of Germany’s presence and the internal political upheaval was a 
“political structure…often described as a dual colonialism,” where Tutsi elites 
worked to exploit the lower Hutu class alongside the Germans.7  While the Tutsis 
were the minority group in Rwanda, for centuries they had ruled over the Hutu.  
When the Tutsis migrated into Rwanda, they were established as economically 
superior herders.  Owning cattle elevated inhabitants financially and with this 
supremacy, the Tutsis took control first at the community level then in the 
monarchy.  The Tutsis maintained their prominent position in the country when the 
Germans arrived and after World War I when Rwanda was given to Belgium.  When 
the colonial powers entered Rwanda they aggravated this social division.  
Eventually the social stratifications changed and in the 1930s, Belgium solidified the 
shift of socio‐economic classes into different ethnicities.8 
  Belgium held colonial power in Rwanda until 1962.  Following the Germans’ 
lead, Belgium initially accepted the established hierarchy in Rwanda and favored the 
ruling Tutsis.  As Belgians influenced the established social divisions and instituted 
                                                        
6 Uvin, 17.   
7 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda, (New York: Picador, 1998), 54.    
8 Jan Vansina’s Antecedents to Modern Rwanda is the most accurate and accessible history of 
pre‐colonial Rwanda. 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rigid ethnic classifications, scientific tests were administered to separate the groups 
and support Tutsi favoritism.  These tests included measuring nose and skull sizes 
and counting the number of cattle owned by individuals or families.  Because Tutsis 
supposedly had more Caucasian features and generally more cattle, they continued 
to be the preferred group in Rwanda.  
This favoritism aggravated an already tense situation as Belgians made “this 
polarization the cornerstone of their colonial policy” in Rwanda.9  These tense 
situations were not originally linked to the ethnic problems created by the 
colonizers, but instead stemmed from the ruling class’ abuse of the struggling lower 
class.  The Belgians made continually more invasive changes within Rwanda, 
starting with the removal of all undesirable local leaders.  These undesirables 
included the few Hutu leaders and Tutsis unwilling to act as puppets of the Belgian 
government.  From 1933 to 1934 Belgium implemented the most damaging change, 
the introduction of ethnic identification cards.  These cards, explained journalist 
Philip Gourevitch, made “it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsis, and 
permitted the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid system rooted 
in the myth of Tutsi superiority.”10  The Catholic Church, the leading religious 
organization in Rwanda, supported this new system.  These changes quickly 
solidified ethnic lines.   
  This situation lasted until a revolution in 1959 put Hutus in power over the 
minority Tutsi group.  African countries began to break free from their colonial 
masters in the early 1950s, and within a decade almost all African nations outside of 
                                                        
9 Gourevitch, 54.   
10 Gourevitch, 57. 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southern Africa were independent.  Rwandan independence came on the heels of 
the Hutu Revolution of 1959.  As plans were being laid for independence, Hutus 
revolted and overthrew the Tutsi monarchy, replacing it with a presidential 
republic.  Contrary to many other African independence movements, the push for 
Rwandan independence involved an ethnic and social revolution that intensified 
interethnic animosity. 
  The Hutu Revolution entailed several stages of violence.  Outbreaks began as 
“localized anti‐Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some provinces; hundreds were 
killed, and quite a few Tutsi fled the country.”11  Along with widespread violence, 
over 100,000 Tutsis fled Rwanda to neighboring countries.  Catholic priests and 
Belgian officials had encouraged this first stage of violence for months before it 
climaxed.  Following World War II, Rwanda saw an influx of Belgian Flemish Priests, 
who as a minority in their home country, identified with the disenfranchised Hutu 
population.  Sympathizing with the Hutus, the newly arrived priests encouraged 
them to fight for power.12  In tandem with this new influence, the United Nations 
applied pressure on Belgium to relinquish its colonial control.  These influences led 
to the creation of a united Hutu front calling for radical change. 
  In March 1957, the second stage of revolution began when Hutu intellectuals 
published the Hutu Manifesto, arguing for democracy and calling for the removal of 
Tutsis from power.  Philip Gourevitch described the situation, “As new Hutu parties 
sprang up, rallying the masses to unite in their ‘Hutuness,’ the enthusiastic Belgians 
scheduled the elections.  But before any Rwandans saw a ballot box, hundreds of 
                                                        
11 Uvin, 19.  
12 Gourevitch, 58. 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them were killed.”13  Starting in November 1957, violence broke out regularly 
between Tutsis and Hutus across the country.  This violence was spurred by 
Catholic priests and encouraged by retreating Belgian colonialists.  The Belgians 
supported the Hutu power grab partly in retaliation for Tutsis resistance to colonial 
control.  The United Nations also encouraged the switch to majoritarian rule as the 
independence movement in Rwanda progressed.14  The colonial authorities 
eventually acknowledged the social revolution occurring within Rwanda, and “the 
break between the Belgian authorities and their long‐coddled Tutsi elite [came] 
about only because the colonial administrators felt betrayed by their erstwhile 
protégés.”15  The violence continued sporadically for decades, and became one of the 
first concerns of USAID in independent Rwanda. 
  In January 1961, following the trend across Africa, “the Belgians convened a 
meeting of Rwanda’s new Hutu leaders, at which the monarchy was officially 
abolished and Rwanda was declared a republic.”16  On July 1, 1962 Rwanda became 
an independent nation.  This seminal event started a new journey of development 
that included interactions and partnerships with USAID.  Belgian colonial policy had 
employed development practices and programs, but as a newly independent nation, 
Rwanda was able to play a larger role in their development and promote their own 
development objectives.  Grégoire Kayibanda was inaugurated as President and the 
new Hutu dictatorship “masqueraded as popular democracy, and Rwanda’s power 
                                                        
13 Gourevitch, 58.  
14 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide 
in Rwanda, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 116.  
15 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (New York: Columbia Press, 
1995), 50.  
16 Gourevitch, 61. 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struggles became an internal affair of the Hutu elite.”17  The Hutus in power 
reproduced abuses that had been committed against them during the Tutsi 
monarchy, while pretending to support their new system of democracy.  Kayibanda 
hid behind a veil of democracy with the support from Hutu elites and the West as he 
continued terrorizing his opponents.  Rwanda received Western support because its 
proximity to Zaire, which was of critical strategic importance during the Cold War.  
Ethnic violence increased and became “a central feature of Rwanda’s politics.”18  In 
cross border raids, Tutsi refugees attacked the Hutu population and government, 
and the Rwandan government retaliated against the Tutsis remaining in Rwanda.  
This situation continued and worsened in the following decades. 
   
  The early 1960s also saw the creation of USAID.  As decolonization spread 
across Africa and the threat of communism expanded, U.S. support for foreign aid 
grew because it “was seen as a tool to reduce discontent generated by poverty and 
the consequent temptations of communism by spurring economic progress and 
addressing the social and political tensions created by rapid economic change.”19  
After World War II, the United States government launched economic development 
and assistance programs, such as the Marshall Plan.  When Eisenhower took office, 
he reduced the amount of funding available to the programs started by Truman’s 
administration.  Eisenhower’s aid was tied to mutual security assistance, until 1957 
                                                        
17 Gourevitch, 61.  
18 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), 52‐53.  
19 Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the 
Challenges of the Twenty­First Century, (Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institute, the Global Economy 
and Development: Monograph Series on Globalization, 2005), 10. 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when he reversed this policy and created several development organizations and 
projects.20  This move solidified development aid’s position in U.S. foreign policy.  As 
a senator, Kennedy criticized Eisenhower’s failure to appreciate the true importance 
of foreign aid.  Adding to the recent advances made by Eisenhower, the election of 
President John F. Kennedy in 1960 made development aid a crucial aspect of U.S. 
foreign relations.      
  When Kennedy took office, he declared the 1960s a “decade of development.”  
During his presidential campaign, Kennedy constantly emphasized that America 
would have to “demonstrate to the ‘emerging countries’ that development along 
liberal, capitalist lines could alleviate poverty and raise living standards at least as 
fast as revolutionary and Marxist alternatives.”21  Following through on these 
campaign promises, Kennedy established the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 1961 by merging two existing aid agencies, the 
Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Agency22 into a single 
entity that would be semi‐autonomous within the Department of State.23  USAID was 
intended to further international development and U.S. diplomacy in the newly 
emerging nations of Africa and Asia.  While USAID was connected to diplomatic 
goals, it was kept semi‐autonomous to separate it from Eisenhower’s preference for 
                                                        
20 Samuel Butterfield, U.S. Development Aid: An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in 
the Twentieth Century, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 59. These organizations included the 
Development Loan Fund, Inter‐American Development Bank and support the Social Progress Trust 
Fund through the Development Bank.  
21 Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” 
in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 28.  
22 The International Cooperation Agency (ICA) was part of the Department of State 
responsible for technical assistance.  
23 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 71‐72. 
20 
 
linking aid with security interests.  President Kennedy wanted to distinguish 
development from diplomacy institutionally.  
Beginning in the 1960s, USAID became responsible, in consultation with the 
Department of State, for  
the policies, country allocations, and uses of development assistance (used to 
promote economic growth, education, and agricultural development, health 
and family planning and democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian 
assistance, and child survival) and disaster relief and recovery.24  
 
Within the first few years USAID programs had expanded across the globe, and were 
providing assistance to the inhabitants of developing countries on four continents.  
By 1963, there were USAID programs in almost 30 African nations.25  During the 
1960s, USAID programs were founded in modernization theory, and its primary 
goals were to provide assistance in health, education and agriculture, bringing the 
standards of these domains closer to those of modern nations. 
 
  USAID began working in Rwanda during its first year of independence in 
1962.  Foreign aid “promised to be a useful tool in promoting democracy, especially 
in sub‐Saharan Africa – both as an incentive for governments to implement political 
reforms and a source of financing for activities related to democratization.”26  The 
United States government was concerned that newly independent countries would 
turn to communist regimes, especially if requests for American aid were denied.  On 
                                                        
24 Carol Lancaster, Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty­First 
Century, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, the Global Economy and Development: Monograph 
Series on Globalization, 2005), 14‐15. 
25 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to do, So Little Done, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 84. 
26 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 47. 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the surface, Rwanda was a prime candidate for USAID assistance, promoting its first 
democratic government as the United States helped to foster growth to consolidate 
strategic interests in the region.  Rwanda was a tactical position between Zaire and 
Tanzania, seen both as a potential ally and threat during the Cold War.  To help 
democracy take hold, USAID promoted sectors crucial to survival and education; 
security and infrastructure (primarily in the capital, Kigali) became the donor’s first 
project areas.  USAID’s strategy in these first years was to “demonstrate interest in 
the economic development of the country, support adoption of a fundamental fiscal 
and monetary reform, and assist the Government of Rwanda in maintaining internal 
security.”27  These original economic reform initiatives in Rwanda helped the new 
country become established and stable without the direction of their old colonial 
leader.  Modernization theorists of the 1960s drove these initial programs and 
policy objectives, assuming that with assistance “traditional” Rwanda could develop 
in the same manner as the West.  USAID documents demonstrated the goals 
employed in Rwanda, specifically the importance of creating strong ties between the 
new country and new organization.   
USAID approached education assistance from various angles.  Ambassador 
Charles D. Withers presented the first foreign aid program to Rwanda as an 
independence gift: scholarship funds for Rwandans to study at universities in the 
United States.  USAID also established regional scholarship programs for students 
attending local universities.  Eventually USAID also provided support for American 
professors to teach at Rwandan universities and purchased necessary school 
                                                        
27 Lynn Elizabeth Grosz, “A History of the USAID Program in Rwanda 1962‐1985.” (Kigali, 
Rwanda, 1986), unpublished report available at USAID DEC, 3. 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equipment.28  Supervised by USAID Liaison Officer at the U.S. Embassy Gene Moore, 
USAID support also included several short‐term training courses and two 
undergraduate degree courses, a grant for twenty regional scholarships for students 
already enrolled in Rwandan university classes, and an equipment grant to the 
University in Butare.  Another independence gift of thirty training grants for civil 
service fields was also administered.29  From 1962 through 1968, “the United States 
Government provided $20,000 for scholarships to American Universities.”30  In the 
following decades USAID became more involved and provided more money for 
youth education, from primary school to high school equivalency and vocational 
training courses. 
  As Kennedy reshaped the objectives and influences of foreign assistance, the 
United States moved away from influencing people primarily through military 
means and started persuading them with ‘softer’ means.  Rostow’s 1961 
commencement address at Fort Bragg exemplified this new ideology by charging the 
graduating class to fight “not merely with weapons but … in the minds of men in 
villages and hills; [fight] by the spirit and policy of those who run the local 
government, to intervene directly and engage themselves in the whole creative 
process of modernization.”31  These USAID education projects of the 1960s 
represented the needs of newly independent Rwanda and the shift from the first 
stage of modernization theory to the second.  As explained by Rostow, in order to 
                                                        
28 Grosz, 3. 
29 Grosz, 5. 
30 Grosz, 3. 
31 Latham, 1‐2. 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advance from a traditional society to a society with the preconditions to take‐off, a 
commitment to secular education was necessary. 
Education programs worked to prevent the spread of communism, helped fill 
vacant administrative positions previously filled by Belgian officials, and insured a 
continued alliance with the United States.  Controlling the production of knowledge, 
education was the easiest way to indoctrinate people.  As an effective way of 
influencing political beliefs, the education projects helped ensure Rwandans would 
steer clear of communism.  Addressing the needs of Rwanda, USAID helped to fill 
positions left by Belgians.  The university and technical training provided Rwandans 
with the capabilities to fill the many high level positions available in the Rwandan 
government.  Finally, the education projects that taught both the horrors of 
communism and the skills needed to run their country also instructed Rwandans to 
remain loyal to the United States.  The emerging educated leaders of Rwanda were 
taught to ally themselves and their country with the U.S. 
 
  USAID’s help regarding infrastructure was limited during the 1960s, and 
focused primarily on Kigali, Rwanda’s capital.  Small projects included furnishing 
nursing schools in Kigali with transistor radios, and other small cash grants for local 
commodities.  In 1966, the United States increased aid levels to Rwanda and several 
more programs were activated.  One reason for the “increased activity was an 
agreement between Rwanda and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) signed in 
April 1966.”32  The agreement required the government of Rwanda to devalue the 
                                                        
32 Grosz, 4. 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Rwandan franc in exchange for standby credit from the IMF.  The increased aid from 
USAID provided commodity import programs, providing trucks, vehicle equipment 
and raw plastic as well as staples such as flour, oil and milk.  These commodities 
were sold to and benefitted importers.  This food was monetized and sold to raise 
funds, instead of being consumed by Rwandans.  The government of Rwanda was 
“assured a supply of basic commodities was available without spending its foreign 
exchange, the funds financed projects planned by both governments, and consumers 
were able to buy basic items.”33  When these projects were completed and deemed 
successful by USAID, the allotted support amount was increased. 
  Beginning in late 1966 and continuing through 1968, USAID provided funds 
and technical support for paving streets in Kigali and constructing a water 
purification plant for the capital.  These basic infrastructure projects contributed to 
the second stage of modernization, encouraging the preconditions to take‐off.  Along 
with education, a society was thought to need to enable a degree of capital 
mobilization, which would be difficult for Rwanda without infrastructure assistance 
from USAID.  Then at the end of 1968, USAID support was almost completely cut 
from Rwanda and the number of programs was significantly reduced as “the 
unpopular war in Vietnam discredited many development ideas and there was 
growing distrust of the state to be the primary agent to promote development.”34  
Before these funds were eliminated, USAID was able to help advise the government 
on security problems.  
                                                        
33 Grosz, 4. 
34 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 10.  
25 
 
   The infrastructure programs implemented in the 1960s worked to steady a 
Rwanda that was lost without its colonial guide.  As with many colonies, after 
decolonization experts, leaders, and administrators left their colonial positions and 
returned home to Europe.  The education projects discussed earlier addressed how 
USAID helped train Rwandans to fill these vacant positions.  The infrastructure 
programs worked with these courses to keep Rwanda progressing forward.  The 
construction of roads, water plants, and furnishing nursing schools and providing 
commodities kept development going and allowed Rwanda to gain stability for the 
future.   
  As discussed previously, the security situation within Rwanda was tenuous 
with sporadic fighting between the government and rebel refugee Tutsis in Uganda, 
Zaire, and Burundi.  In July 1963 the government of Rwanda requested equipment 
and construction assistance from USAID to help its internal security forces, 
including both military and police forces.  This initial request was denied.  Then in 
December 1963, Tutsi exiles launched a desperate attack from Burundi.  Invading 
Bugesera, a medium‐sized village in southern Rwanda, and almost reaching Kigali, 
the exiles were disorganized and the government was able to beat them back to the 
border. The Rwandan government “used the occasion to launch a massive wave of 
repression in which an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were slaughtered between December 
1963 and January 1964.”35   
  The rebel attack in late 1963 forced the United States to reconsider Rwanda’s 
request for security assistance.  Unfortunately, the U.S. apparently did not consider 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its role in the growing ethnic violence by providing security assistance.  In the 
spring of 1964, a United States police survey team arrived and after inspection 
proposed appropriate and needed changes to improve Rwanda’s security situation.  
While ignoring its role in the increasing ethnic violence in Rwanda, the U.S. also did 
not criticize the Rwandan government for the retaliation committed against Tutsis 
residing within the country.  The survey team report noted that until its initial 
request was denied, Rwanda was pro‐western.  But “since their first request for 
military and police commodity assistance had been rejected, Rwanda had become 
critical and suspicious of all current efforts to assist them in the field.”36  Worried 
about loosing a critically located ally, the survey team recommended the United 
States provide technical and commodity assistance to keep Rwanda from possible 
communist leanings.  While Rwanda had grown distrustful, finally receiving the 
assistance they requested apparently mitigated their fears about U.S. security 
assistance.  
The United States perceived there to be communist threats surrounding 
Rwanda, including Tanzania.  Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, 
implemented a socialist government, and fears arose that socialism would spill out 
from Tanzania into Rwanda and beyond.  The fear of communism spreading into 
East and Central Africa led to a public safety project launched in 1964.  Over five 
years USAID provided $70,000 to the Rwandan government for both the military 
and policy force for communication and transportation equipment, along with two 
advisors providing technical training for use and maintenance of the equipment. 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There were also short‐term training programs that took place in the United States to 
help the Rwandan government better handle the refugee and rebel situation.37   
  USAID documents clearly demonstrate that U.S. aid strategy focused on the 
“adoption of fundamental fiscal and monetary reform, assist[ed] maintaining 
internal security, and support[ed] small, viable development projects.”38  These 
fiscal reform policies were geared towards helping the newly independent nation 
become financially stable and productive on its own.  While these projects were 
underway, monetary support from the United States Congress to USAID programs 
was almost completely cut, signifying concerns about money spent abroad instead 
of domestically.  At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1968, the Public 
Safety/Communications Advisor and the USAID Liaison Officer left Rwanda and 
from 1969 to 1973, USAID activities in Rwanda were limited to PL 480 Title II and 
the Embassy administered Self Help Program.  USAID funds for Rwanda were too 
low to continue support for these aid workers as their projects were slowly 
wrapped up or cancelled.  
The PL 480 Title II program,39 also known as Food for Peace, received almost 
three million dollars during the first seven years that USAID was active in Rwanda 
and focused assistance to maternal and child health and school feeding programs.  
The Catholic Relief Service distributed most of the food, which continued after 
                                                        
37 Grosz, 4. 
38 Grosz, 5. 
39 PL stands for Public Law, shorten from the 1954 Agricultural Trade Development 
Assistance Act. There are four parts to the act, Title I is managed by the United States Department of 
Agriculture, while Titles II, III and V are run by USAID. For more information on the PL 480 Title 
programs see Nick Cullather’s The Hungry World. 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USAID funds were cut.40  The Self Help Programs provided small amounts of funds 
to Rwandans with promising development ideas.  Both programs were important to 
Rwanda, but the Food for Peace programs were crucial and, in fact, have continued 
into the twenty‐first century. 
  Initially, in 1963 the U.S. Congress complained about the large amount of aid 
programs in Africa, arguing that money should be directed toward problems at 
home.  While President Kennedy fielded Congress’ complaints and received advice 
from reports recommending reductions of projects in Africa, aid programs 
continued.  Years later, President Johnson heeded to the requests and suggestions to 
reduce aid programs and “by the early 1970s, there were only 10 operating in the 
region.”41  The main reasons for the criticisms and attacks on aid programs in Africa 
stemmed from misunderstandings and discontent over current events.  As 
development aid was still a new phenomenon, it was difficult for the American 
public and Congress to recognize the successes and challenges USAID experienced.  
Americans were also frustrated and disenchanted with development after the 
amount of funds spent on the Vietnam War, arguing that money should now be 
refocused on domestic issues.  The U.S. government was disappointed with the 
number of military coups taking hold in Africa, which made them question the value 
of development aid and the effectiveness of their democratization programs.  
Additionally, “criticisms of too extensive U.S. engagements worldwide led the 
administration to close a number of its aid missions abroad (especially in sub‐
                                                        
40 Grosz, 6.  
41 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 85. 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Saharan Africa) during the second half of the 1960s.”42  All these frustrations led the 
U.S. Congress to reduce the amount of money available to USAID.  While USAID lost 
most of its funding for projects in Rwanda, in 1973, U.S. foreign policy ideology 
shifted again as events in both countries set the stage for new funding and broader 
objectives.   
 
                                                        
42 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 75. 
 
 
Chapter 2: “New Directions” for Rwanda 
  The 1960s began with two significant events: the creation of USAID in the 
United States and Rwanda’s declaration of independence.  While the relationship 
between Rwanda and the U.S. was curtailed with the dramatic cuts of 1968, the 
events of the 1970s recovered lost ground.  As modernization theory was phased 
out of U.S. practice, a new basic needs mandate rose to replace it.  In the early 1970s 
several events affected the relationship between America and Rwanda.  During 
1973, in Rwanda first, then in the United States, political actions changed the 
outlook and reception of development aid.  In Rwanda, Major General Juvénal 
Habyarimana staged a coup, and declared himself President.  Months later the U.S. 
Congress, along with many other development organizations, initiated new 
mandates to focus on the poorest of the poor in the world.  The years following 1973 
saw major increases in aid provided from USAID and a more receptive and 
progressive atmosphere in Rwanda accepting this surge of assistance.  Changes in 
the period from the late 1960s to 1973, set the stage for new USAID programs and 
projects in Rwanda.  
    
   President Grégoire Kayibanda assumed power in Rwanda after 
independence in 1962 and realized the desire of many Hutus to be led by a Hutu 
government.  The Kayibanda regime continued the hostilities of the Hutu Revolution 
and “chased or killed most former Tutsi power holders and politicians, even the 
most moderate ones, as well as many opposition Hutu politicians who didn’t join 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Parmehutu.”1  While Kayibanda achieved these goals most Rwandans, both Hutus 
and Tutsis, lived in fear of the government’s sporadic campaigns of violence.  In 
1972 ethnic violence broke out in Burundi and political disturbances left around 
200,000 dead; hundreds of thousands more Hutus sought refuge in Rwanda.  In 
May‐June 1972, “Burundi had been ravaged by a massive massacre of Hutu carried 
out by the Tutsi minority in order to keep its hold on political power.”2   
Burundi has an almost identical ethnic makeup as Rwanda, but when the 
Hutu Revolution took power from the Tutsis in Rwanda, the minority Tutsi group in 
Burundi held onto their rule while declaring Burundian independence.  As hundreds 
of thousands of Burundian Hutus spilled into Rwanda in 1972, President Kayibanda 
tried to exploit the situation for political gain and began to attack the Rwandan Tutsi 
minority again.  Over 40,000 Tutsis were victims of attacks encouraged by 
Kayibanda between March 1962 and late 1964, and this sporadic violence continued 
until 1972.3  President Kayibanda asked his senior army commander Major‐General 
Juvénal Habyarimana to lead the 1972 attack on the Rwandan Tutsis.   
Habyarimana recognized the new strains felt in Rwanda and the increased 
tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis and made his grab for power.  While the 
overflow of refugees exacerbated existing ethnic tensions, both groups resented the 
continually irregular attacks that disrupted their daily lives.  Habyarimana relied on 
support from his region in the north and from Rwandans persecuted and exhausted 
                                                        
1 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (Hartford: Kumarian 
Press, 1998), 23. Parmehutu was Kayibanda’s political party organized during the Hutu Revolution.  
2 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (New York: Columbia Press, 
1995), 60. For more information on the 1972 events in Burundi please see Rene Lemarchand, 
Burundi: Ethnocide as theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press: 1994.  
3 Uvin, 20.  
32 
 
by Kayibanda’s regime.  On July 5, 1973 Habyarimana took power in a bloodless 
coup, starting the Second Republic as Hutus and Tutsis expressed widespread relief.  
This change did not eliminate decades of ethnic hatred, but Hutus and Tutsis did 
hope to lead lives uninterrupted by campaigns of violence.   
Habyarimana organized a military dictatorship and offered a compromise to 
the Tutsis to help stabilize the country; if they stayed out of politics they could lead 
reasonably normal lives.  Habyarimana’s iron fist rule created stability and 
improved development prospects.  However,  
the main strength of Rwanda’s regimes lay not in their oppression but in 
their capacity to legitimize themselves to internal and external forces. To 
achieve this … a ‘development’ legitimization [was] aimed at both the 
international Bazungu audience and the domestic one.4 
 
When Habyarimana took power, Rwanda was poorer than its neighbors.  This 
poverty combined with Habyarimana’s skill at attracting Western development 
agencies led to a surge of assistance.  Development was Habyarimana’s favorite 
political word, “appealing to European and American aid donors whom he milked 
with great skill.”5  Western development organizations, including USAID, favored 
Habyarimana because he brought an end to Kayibanda’s violent campaigns, and 
made declarations of commitment to developing Rwanda that preferred Western 
capitalism to communism.  Conditions within Rwanda changed drastically in the 
following years. 
  Starting in 1974, the year after Habyarimana’s coup d’état, the government 
made several significant changes regarding development.  One of its acts included 
                                                        
4 Uvin, 23.  
5 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
Families: Stories From Rwanda, (New York: Picador, 1998), 69. 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the “pronouncement that attributed Rwanda’s 143 communes the role of ‘motor of 
development.’  From now on, the communes would be the basic unit of 
development.”6  This was a significant change because most previous development 
projects had been centered on the capital or other large cities, instead of rural 
communes.  Habyarimana declared 1974 the year of agriculture and manual labor, 
changed the name of the single party to Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le 
Developpment (MRND) and, later, renamed the parliament the National 
Development Council.7  These changes appealed to Western governments and 
donors.    
  All these transformations turned Rwanda into what German Pastor Herbert 
Keiner described as ‘ein Entwicklungsdiktatur,’ a development dictatorship.  This 
ideology was similar to colonial theories of “benevolent despotism, as President 
Habyarimana decided to take upon his shoulders the heavy burden of the state so 
his subjects could devote themselves entirely to agriculture.”8  This ideology 
legitimized the government’s intrusion into all aspects of social life.  Because the 
Rwandan government’s development ideology focused heavily on economic 
development, aid agencies abroad felt compelled to implement their projects 
through the government.  This arrangement allowed the Rwandan government to 
funnel the majority of assistance to the groups consisting of Hutus. 
While Habyarimana favored the Hutus blatantly, he did bring political 
stability to Rwanda and deliver assistance to failing regions, regardless of their 
                                                        
6 Uvin, 24.  
7 Uvin, 24. MRND stands for National Revolutionary Development Movement.  
8 Prunier, 77. 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ethnic composition.  Despite remaining desperately poor, Rwanda’s international 
reputation soared,  
in part because it was finally demonstrating some economic development in 
a region lacking any good news. One‐party stability, the dampening of ethnic 
conflict, modest economic progress invested Rwanda with a reputation for 
stability and hope. Outsiders routinely touted Rwanda as a model of 
efficiency and referred to it as the Switzerland of Central Africa.9 
 
These changes helped to reinvigorate USAID assistance to Rwanda in the 1970s.  
 
  1973 also saw a significant change in U.S. foreign policy that affected 
American assistance globally.  The Vietnam War and the growing domestic 
opposition to the war had negatively affected America’s perceptions of international 
affairs.  The war increased the Congress’ role in foreign economic assistance policy.  
In the early 1970s, the Democratic Congress “refused to pass a foreign aid 
authorization bill to protest the Nixon administration’s policies in Vietnam.”10  
Continuing the Congress’ stance against using development aid for the war in 
Vietnam, 1973’s the New Directions bill was passed.  During the 1960s, U.S. aid was 
often used to modernize societies and promote growth, but with the New Directions 
Mandate, foreign aid emphasized the goal of poverty alleviation.  
  A group of Congressmen were able to drive their legislation through the 
House of International Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees, 
authorizing the New Directions Mandate.  The legislation brought about “a major 
reform of U.S. aid that involved policy rather than organizational change: aid was 
                                                        
9 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2002), 53.  
10 Carol Lancaster, Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the Twenty­First 
Century, (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 46. 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reoriented toward providing for the basic human needs of those in poor 
countries.”11  Basic human needs included primary health care, basic education, 
shelter, and agricultural assistance.  These members of Congress were able to push 
this mandate through because it had support throughout the government and the 
development community.  These groups believed it was time to refocus on 
development after “its use in the war in Indochina to prop up governments.”12  
  Other domestic and international events also influenced this change.  In 
1974, the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola declared independence, 
escalating Cold War tensions.  Domestically, the increased number of African 
Americans in politics led to a rise in support for African aid.13  These changes helped 
spur increased activity and levels of aid to African nations, including Rwanda.  The 
increased levels of support focused on country allocations, emphasized poorer 
countries, and highlighted goals to improve education, health care and rural 
agricultural development.14  The New Directions Mandate, often referred to as the 
Basic Human Needs mandate in popular and professional discussions, was a distinct 
shift away from modernization practices of the previous decade.  
  During the 1960s, USAID focused on general resource transfers that helped 
stabilize the newly emerging African nations but with the New Directions Mandate 
USAID’s reentry into Rwanda would be drastically different.  The most distinctive 
                                                        
11 Carol Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (Washington D.C.: 
Center for Global Development, 2008), 13.  
12 Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid, 14.  
13 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 86.  
14 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 76. 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feature of the new mandate “was that it proposed to concentrate economic 
assistance into five functional budget categories: Food and Nutrition, Population 
Planning and Health, Education and Human Resource Development, Selected 
Development Problems, and Selected Countries and Organizations.”15  
Habyarimana’s rebranding of Rwanda as a development state appealed to aid 
organizations and fit with the New Directions Mandated for USAID.  
  Habyarimana shifted the center of development in Rwanda from the major 
cities to the rural communes, embracing the New Directions Mandate.  USAID 
“involv[ed] [the rural poor] directly in the development process.”16  Another major 
difference from the 1960s was the removal of security projects from the 
development sector.  A 1973 Congressional Research Service summary concluded 
“security assistance should be administered separately from development 
assistance.”17  Despite previous projects assisting Rwanda with security, all 
assistance in the 1970s was directed at improving basic human needs.  The 1970s 
saw rapid increases in aid, particularly during the later half, beginning with a 
Congressional initiative and continued by President Carter. 
  This focus was reinforced with the election of President Jimmy Carter in 
1976.  The Carter Administration “entered office committed to the objectives of the 
basic human needs mandate.”18  Over the course of the 1970s, the international 
human rights movement gained momentum and “politicians, most notably President 
                                                        
15 Vernon Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of 
Foreign Economic Aid, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94.  
16 Ruttan, 94. 
17 Ruttan, 107. 
18 Ruttan, 119. 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Jimmy Carter, started to invoke human rights as the guiding rationale of the foreign 
policy of states.”19  Expanding his support for human rights in the 1980s, President 
Carter added emphasis on women’s needs and advancements in U.S. foreign aid.  
USAID annual reports demonstrate the wide variety of projects implemented to 
improve basic human needs in the rural sector of Rwanda.  
USAID relations with the Government of Rwanda improved with 
Habyarimana’s regime.  Starting in 1973, “the Government of Rwanda’s 
development priorities were in step with USAID goals and strategies.”20  Over a 
period of 18 months, four different USAID teams came to Rwanda to discuss projects 
that would significantly contribute to the country’s development plan.  Starting in 
1974 the Government of Rwanda presented 23 project proposals to USAID.  While 
not all 23 were approved, eventually USAID programs increased from three in 1975 
to twelve in 1980.  The United States used to be a minor donor to Rwanda, but in the 
last half of the 1970s, “the U.S. government began to put considerable effort into 
developing and expanding its program in Rwanda.”21  
 
The USAID Rwanda Annual Budget Submission for FY 1977, written in 
August 1975 outlined some of the first projects implemented under the New 
Directions Mandate.  An initial project included Cooperative Development, 
improving the access of the population living in cooperatives to development inputs, 
                                                        
19 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), 5.  
20 Lynn Elizabeth Grosz, “A History of the USAID Program in Rwanda 1962‐1985.” (Kigali, 
Rwanda, 1986), unpublished report available at USAID DEC, 6.  
21 Grosz, 8. 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such as technical training sessions.  This project “provided necessary underpinnings 
to the Government of Rwanda program of developing local, specialized 
cooperatives.”22  Emphasis was placed on production cooperatives, including both 
agricultural and non‐agricultural cooperatives.  Cooperative Development aimed to 
organize people into groups in order to “allow other scarce resources to be utilized 
more effectively [to] result in a synergistic effect.”23  The components of this project 
included cooperative training, providing materials and equipment, and consultants.  
The benefits helped the Government of Rwanda’s cooperative programs and 
indirectly helped thousands of small rural farmers participating in cooperatives.  
The short‐lived Cooperative Development project, working to reinforce the 
new communal reorganization of Rwanda, represented the new goals with USAID’s 
New Directions initiative by working directly with the rural population and 
improving their standard of living economically, politically and socially.  By helping 
these communes recognize their human resource potential, identify strengths and 
methods of better communication and teamwork these rural communities were 
given possibilities to change their situation.  This project did not continue for more 
than a year because the Rwandan government was unable to identify specific 
projects within cooperatives requiring further USAID assistance.  But USAID was 
able to help guide local participants and leaders in continuing to strengthen 
cooperatives across the country. 
Another project outlined in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1977 included 
the Farm Hand Tools – Blacksmiths project.  The project ran from 1975 through 
                                                        
22 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1977,” July 1975, 16.  
23 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1977,” 17. 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1978 and attempted to support rural vocational training by helping “Rwanda[n] 
blacksmiths to the degree of skill necessary to manufacture and repair hand tools 
commonly used or essential to the farm system and provide these with the 
minimum necessary tool kit.”24  At the time, there were inadequate numbers of 
blacksmiths available to provide and fix farm tools across Rwanda.  This program 
continued another project originally started by a Swiss development organization 
and even used the original Swiss training site.  The Swiss project was terminated 
due to instability in Rwanda in 1972, and USAID made a few alternations when it 
resumed the project in 1975.  After review, the USAID Farm Tools Projected 
provided consultants to create course materials to produce capable blacksmiths, 
tuition assistance for 120 students annually for three years, basic tool kit for 
graduates, and equipment for the training center.25   
This project also helped create better economic conditions for farmers and 
blacksmiths.  Rwanda imported approximately 100,000 hoes annually.  By 
increasing the number of blacksmiths available within Rwanda, hoes could be 
produced and sold locally, and materials repaired.  Farm tools were predicted to last 
three years with annual repairs necessary, with the calculation of 2,750,00 hand‐
tools existing and 900,000 needing repairs or replacement annually.26  This project 
expanded a domestic market instead of relying on foreign imports.  Rwanda had 
been buying hoes from Great Britain, but with continued blacksmith training this 
import could be eliminated, improving Rwanda’s economic possibilities.  
                                                        
24 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1977,” 9.  
25 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1977,” 11.  
26 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1977,” 14. 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The Annual Budget Submission for FY 1979, written in June 1977, provided 
an update and the last information available on the project.  USAID continued to 
assist reestablishing the blacksmith‐training center and provided technical 
assistance and equipment.27  The project was terminated after the original three‐
year plan likely because USAID considered the number of proficient blacksmiths in 
Rwanda sufficient.  USAID assumed the Rwandan government would continue 
support for vocational trainings, including the blacksmith project.  
Similar to the assistance provided to communes through the Cooperative 
Development project, the Blacksmith training program helped provide alternative 
options to rural inhabitants.  The majority of Rwandans were farmers and 
increasing farming continually added more pressure to overused plots.  This 
problem was countered by the Blacksmith program as it increased educational 
options with vocational training, relieved land pressures by reducing the number of 
farmers, offered different economic options for the rural population and improved 
the overall economic condition of Rwanda by eliminating a large import and 
creating an emerging domestic market for farm tools creation and maintenance.  
This project reflected the political changes within Rwanda and the changes in 
USAID objectives during the 1970s.  By focusing on rural employment options and 
helping to reduce the number of farmers, the Blacksmith project followed the 
Rwandan government’s command to direct foreign assistance to the rural 
communes.  After Habyarimana took power, he dedicated more attention and 
assistance to developing Rwanda, emphasizing the rural sector of the country.  It 
                                                        
27 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1977,” 15. 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also reflected the changed political dynamic felt after Habyarimana’s coup.  The 
original Swiss project ended suddenly in 1972 with the outbreak of violence 
originating in Burundi.  Because Habyarimana calmed the on‐going ethnic 
hostilities, the blacksmith project was able to resume and be completed by USAID.  
The Rwandan government wasn’t the only entity refocusing assistance on the rural 
sector.  With the New Directions Mandate, USAID worked to create new projects 
specific to problems in the countryside.  The blacksmith project directly affected the 
opportunities available to rural inhabitants, relieved pressures felt by rural farmers, 
and improved the overall economic condition of the country by eliminating a regular 
import from Europe.   
 
A third project discussed in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1977 was the 
Food Storage and Marketing project.  This project began in 1975 and was 
considered one of the most significant projects to Rwanda because “while there 
were a relatively wide range of crops, inadequate transportation, limited markets, 
low incomes, poor communication, and other factors combined to keep agricultural 
crops from the markets.”28  The main outputs for the Food Storage and Marketing 
project included eight warehouses, ten Rwandan trainees in the areas of food 
storage and marketing, an operational food marketing office, procedures for 
financial control and warehouse management, and a working capital fund for the 
food marketing office.29  This project’s most important goal was to build adequate 
storage facilities to help protect farmers’ crops.  Rwandans suffered from 
                                                        
28 Grosz, 8. 
29 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1979,” June 1977, 18. 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malnutrition partly because a majority of their crops were lost to insects, animals, 
and mold.  By helping protect crops, the project’s goal was to increase to amount of 
food for families to eat and sell in markets.   
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1979 provided an update on the progress 
of this project.  Within two years of implementation, almost 4,000 tons of beans had 
been stored.  Rwanda sent a project manager to the United States to receive training 
for project administration and analysis.  The project was under revision, calling for 
an expansion of the storage capacity in specific areas and construction of more 
warehouses in others.30  The project remained fully staffed and continued to expand 
due to its rapid success.  Examination and expansions on this project continued into 
the 1980s.  
In the Budget Submission FY 1980, written in May 1978, the Food Storage 
and Marketing project was updated again.  The project’s purpose was to “create an 
efficient food storage and marketing system for staple foods and reduce seasonal 
and regional price fluctuations of staple foods.”31  USAID constructed food storage 
warehouses, provided technical assistance and training that led to a price 
stabilization program.  This program’s aim was to increase food production while 
reducing regional prices allowing producers to receive higher prices.  If producers 
could receive higher prices they would be encouraged to produce more for the 
market.  Since 1975, the Food Storage and Marketing program had expanded to 
increase warehouse capacity and trained additional staff.  Most importantly, since 
1975, “4,450MT of beans, Rwanda’s staple crop, ha[d] been stored and 1,550MT 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Budget Submission: FY 1980,” May 1978, 4. 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sold.”32  This progress benefited the entire population of Rwanda.  As the bean 
prices stabilized, more beans were cultivated and sold, benefiting all Rwandans 
economically and nutritionally.  While the first stage of this project ended in 
December 1980, in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1982, the Food Storage and 
Market II project was outlined. 
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1982, written in June 1980, explained and 
detailed the extended Food Storage and Marketing II program.  This extension 
planned to “increase the impact and effectiveness of the Rwandan government’s 
grain and food pulse storage and price stabilization program, and to develop a 
strategic storage program.”33  USAID estimated that about forty percent of Rwanda’s 
agricultural production was monetized, calling for continued assistance with the 
Food Storage and Marketing project.  The Food Storage and Marketing project 
worked to increase the amount of crops available to be consumed and sold.  With 
the increasing monetization of crops, the project helped to continue that growth.  
The plan extension  
outlined programs to strengthen rural cooperatives to assemble and store 
marketable farm surpluses and to expand the interregional transport and 
marketing system for the transfer of surpluses to deficit areas. A more 
efficient market will encourage increased production.34 
 
The first stage of the project was effective in serving interregional markets, and the 
second phase aimed to continue to expand the market successes.  Ultimately the 
success of this project led to expanded agricultural projects by USAID in Rwanda. 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“Annual…FY 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4. 
33 USAID/Rwanda, 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Submission: FY 1982,” June 1980, 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 While there were many more projects focusing on agricultural assistance, 
there were two that most specifically helped the Food Storage and Marketing 
project.  The Cooperative Grain Storage and Local Crop Storage programs, initiated 
in 1978 and 1979, helped address storage and marketing needs at local levels.  
These programs provided “farmers the tools for increased control over timing of 
sales and a wider range of marketing options, thus giving them a role to play in 
establishing bean and sorghum prices.”35  The continuation of the Food Storage and 
Marketing II project depended on regular examinations and will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.  
  These agricultural assistance programs differed from projects during the 
1960s in a few major ways.  Under the modernization mandate of the 1960s, food 
storage projects would have been geared toward developing modern industry for 
trade.  In contrast, under the needs mandate of the 1970s, these projects focused on 
stabilizing food availability and prices for the local population.  The Food Storage 
and Marketing projects and the supporting agricultural programs worked to 
increase farmers’ crops for local markets and personal consumption.  Increasing the 
amount of crops that survived each season led to increased availability and variety 
for local farmers to sell and buy, improving rural economic and health conditions.  
Advancing farmers’ financial situations and nutrition fell under Rwanda’s new focus 
on rural communes and USAID’s New Directions Mandate.  The amount of time and 
resources made available to the Food Storage and Marketing projects demonstrated 
another shift from the 1960s.  In USAID’s first decade assisting Rwanda, there were 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fewer funds available and projects implemented.  With the New Directions Mandate 
there were increased levels of financial assistance and attention made available to 
these new projects.  The needs mandate employed by USAID during the 1970s 
justified the shift from the modernization practices of the 1960s, emphasizing the 
basic human needs of Rwanda’s rural inhabitants.  
  The Annual Budget Submission FY 1979 detailed another important project, 
the Kibuye Agricultural School program that assisted the Government of Rwanda in 
meeting its agricultural needs.  The Kibuye Agricultural School was a major 
institution that trained lower level agricultural staff.36  Because Rwanda was among 
the six poorest countries in the world, had the highest population density in Africa, 
and had over ninety percent of the population relying on agriculture for their 
livelihood, the Kibuye Agricultural School was crucial to improving Rwanda’s 
situation.   
  The purpose of this project was to “expand an institution that could provide a 
greater number of practically trained agricultural technicians: extension agents, 
school teachers and rural vocational education schools staff.”37  With better‐trained 
agriculturalists and specialists, agricultural production in Rwanda could increase.  
Over a three‐year period, USAID assisted the school in improving education by 
providing consultants, trainings, logistical support, and materials.  The Kibuye 
School was unique in Rwanda and was the only school to train young men between 
18 and 20 years old on advanced scientific agricultural practices. 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The two‐year program emphasized general agriculture, forestry, botany, 
ecology, soil science, statistics, zoology, and vegetable production.  USAID assistance 
increased the number of graduates from 25 to 50 and provided more practical 
instructional courses.  The courses were improved with American teachers working 
in Kibuye providing guidance for the Rwandan teachers.38  This assistance began in 
FY 1979 and continued through FY 1981, assuming the government of Rwanda 
would carry on support after 1981.  From the mid‐1970s through the 1980s USAID 
assisted and created several agricultural projects beyond the ones outlined above.  
These other projects included supporting the women’s agricultural school and area 
agricultural production.   
The many agricultural development programs implemented by USAID helped 
Rwanda in more ways than just food production.  The Kibuye Agricultural School 
provided increased educational options, similar to the Blacksmiths project, to the 
rural population.  While many could not afford to attend a Rwandan university, they 
could benefit from the vocational training programs from USAID.  The Agricultural 
school taught Rwandans methods to improve and increase agricultural production, 
which had obvious positive impacts.  Malnutrition and starvation were addressed 
with more food available for consumption and farmers improved economically with 
more to sell in domestic markets.  Despite improved growing techniques, without 
appropriate storage facilities the increase crops would be lost.  The Food Storage 
and Marketing projects were supported by smaller scale, localized projects, 
including the Cooperative Grain Storage and Local Crop Storage projects.  These 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agricultural projects supported the New Directions Mandate and Rwandan 
government development goals in a wide variety of ways, bettering the lives and 
health of rural Rwandans leading to potential economic and social prosperity.  
The New Directions Mandate didn’t solely emphasize improving rural 
agriculture, but rural living conditions in general.  Other projects originating in the 
mid‐1970s and continuing through the next decade worked with infrastructure, 
rural health, and family planning.  Rwanda had no railroads and limited air 
transport, making roads the primary mode of transportation.  The road system 
consisted of bituminous‐surfaced roads, re‐graveled roads, very old graveled roads 
and laterite roads.  Since 1971, traffic in Rwanda had grown at an annual rate of ten 
percent and the number of registered vehicles in Rwanda in 1976 was almost 
13,000.  By improving the road system communications, rural development would 
subsequently progress.39  One major project undertaken during the 1970s to 
improve Rwanda’s limited transportation network was to modernize the Kibuye‐
Gitarama road.  Formally known as the Rural Road project, this major project 
included technical assistance, equipment, on‐the‐job‐training and financial support 
to improve the entire length of road.  
The Kibuye‐Gitarama Road is the main connection to the Nile Crest area, one 
of the poorest and most densely populated areas of Rwanda.  While infrastructure 
was one of the primary focuses for USAID during the 1960s, this project differed 
from those of old modernization mandate in significant ways.  The most obvious 
ways it varied from infrastructure projects of the past were the goals and intent 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behind the project.  During the 1960s, projects were primarily in Kigali or other 
urban centers; these roads were in the country, connecting rural, desperately poor 
sections of Rwanda.  The goal was no longer to help the government stabilize and 
expand after independence, but to reach disconnected regions of Rwanda.  Beyond 
the objective to expand Rwanda’s roadways, the Rural Road project built this road 
specifically to improve the connection between modernized Rwanda and this 
extremely poor section of the country.  The intent to allow assistance to reach this 
region was more important than the actual construction of the road because the 
New Directions Mandate put more emphasis on improving standards of living than 
on the infrastructure projects of the past. 
The Rural Road project would repair the 93 km road between Kibuye and 
Gitarama over three years.  The population along the Zaire‐Nile Crest benefited from 
increased communications, decreased transportation costs, and wider access to 
markets for both selling and buying.  The Ministry of Public Works also benefited 
with the possibility of allocating more funds to other road repairs and the guidance 
of foreign technicians involved in this project.   
The Annual Budget Report FY 1981, written in June 1979, provided a midway 
report on the Rural Roads project.  The repairs to this stretch of road positively 
impacted the 600,000 inhabitants of the region socially and economically.40  The 
Rwandan government provided supervision and skilled labor from the Public Works 
ministry and unskilled labor from the region.  During FY 1980, tests and designs 
were completed, identifying problem areas, and the necessary equipment was 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delivered.  For FY 1981, construction of the road surface, culverts and bridges 
began.  With the rate of progress continuing uninterrupted, the Rural Road project 
was completed in the three‐year timeline and improved living conditions to an 
enormously important and disconnected section of the Rwandan population.  
The Rural Road project connecting Kibuye and Gitarama worked to 
implement USAID’s New Directions Mandate and Rwandan government’s goals of 
bringing development assistance to the rural population.  This Road project allowed 
the poorest section of Rwanda access to development aid.  By making the region 
more accessible not only would USAID be able to expand projects focused on these 
communities, but other donors could also become involved.  Before addressing the 
basic human needs of the regions, donors needed to access the population for 
assessment.  
Another project aimed at helping Rwandan farmers described in the Annual 
Budget Report FY 1981 was the Fish Culture program.  The project worked to 
“develop the capacity of Rwandan farmers to build and maintain productive on‐farm 
fish ponds.”41  There was a high demand for fresh fish in Rwanda and the materials 
necessary for fish farming were readily available in rural sectors, creating a 
possibility to improve economic conditions and the health of rural Rwandans.  The 
USAID Fish Culture project in Rwanda was based on the fish undertaken by colonial 
administrators in Zaire during the 1950s.  This project required Zairians to build 
ponds and farm fish for several years.  While the ponds were abandoned after 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independence, the initial results benefited the farmers involved.42  USAID’s support 
for Rwandan Fish Farms was consistent with the New Directions initiative to 
increase food production and combat malnutrition.  The predicted benefits were 
numerous and could have affected the entire country.  An estimated 1,200 fishponds 
would produce 36MT of fish on 600 farms in ten Rwandan prefectures with USAID’s 
support.  
An updated report on the Fish Farms showed positive growth.  The project 
planning began in 1978 for FY 1980, but before the project even began, the Fish 
Culture project was extended to FY 1984 in 1979.  The Rwandan government 
provided personnel for extension services and pond construction, workspace for 
technical staff and land for the ponds.  This project addressed several of the New 
Directions initiatives: to combat health problems, expand food production and offer 
alternative crops for farmers to grow.  
Similar to the positive benefits of the agricultural projects, the Fish Culture 
project demonstrated the New Directions Mandate and Rwandan government 
initiatives by adding economic, environmental and nutritional diversity in the rural 
sectors of Rwanda.  The Fish Culture program offered a new option for farmers in 
the market, to reduce land pressure, and improve the health of the populace.  Most 
farmers grew the same crops, creating more competition in the market.  By adding 
fish to the array of options, economic gain was possible.  This helped to alleviate the 
overuse of Rwanda’s farmlands and gave farmers a new income source that would 
not deplete fields of valuable nutrients.  Finally, diets were improved with needed 
                                                        
42 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1981,” 10. 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supplements, including protein and iron from fish.  These three areas specifically 
demonstrated the Rwandan government and New Directions goals of addressing 
family health care, agricultural assistance and environmental degradation.  
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1980 also described the first health 
services project addressing rural health care and family planning.  The Rural 
Health/Family Planning program worked to “improve the capacity of the Rwandan 
Government to deliver rural health services by up‐grading and creating the services 
at the dispensary and health center levels.”43  Until this project, USAID’s only 
involvement in Rwanda’s health sector was through PL 480 assistance, run by the 
Catholic Relief Services funding nutrition centers and school feeding programs.  The 
project directly addressed the rapid population growth occurring in Rwanda, 
stressing agricultural production, among many other areas.  The Rural 
Health/Family Planning program focused “on nutrition, preventive medicine and 
family planning by improving the national health delivery system at the clinic and 
dispensary levels.”44  USAID recognized the enormous undertakings this project 
would entail and continued regular updates on its progress in subsequent reports.  
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1981 provided the first‐year update on 
the project.  To assist the Rwandan government in making existing medical services 
more efficient and effective, USAID helped emphasize preventive medicine in the 
rural sector.  At the same time, USAID focused on the rapid population growth 
occurring in Rwanda and promoted knowledge of child spacing techniques, 
establishing education family planning activities and eventually implementing a 
                                                        
43 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1980,” 24.  
44 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1980,” 24. 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national family planning program.  In FY 1980, the project began training programs 
for health workers and construction of rural health centers.45  The project had a 
termination date of FY 1984 because the Government of Rwanda demonstrated 
increased interest and motivation to tackle the burgeoning population problem.  
While this specific program didn’t continue past the mid‐1980s, USAID continued to 
be a primary donor to Rwandan efforts to cope with excessive population growth by 
funding educational family health programs.  
The Rural Health/Family Planning project was the most direct project 
implementing the goals of the Rwandan government and the New Directions 
Mandate.  The other programs described above executed many of the set goals in a 
variety of ways, while the health programs directly bettered the standard of living 
for rural Rwandans.  This health project worked solely to improve the health of 
Rwandan families, particularly mothers and children.  By offering classes on 
nutrition, child spacing, and preventative medicine in the rural sector, the overall 
health of Rwandans improved, thus positively affecting the production, education 
and the outlook of development.  With reduced levels of stress on families, farmers 
could be stronger and more productive, children could participate more fully in 
school, and the involvement in development programs could increase.  
All of the projects described worked toward implementing the New 
Directions goals in Rwanda by focusing on agriculture, health, and education to 
improve the standard of living for Rwandans.  In the Annual Budget Submission FY 
1982, written in June 1980, USAID outlined its long‐range goals to continue helping 
                                                        
45 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1981,” 14. 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rural Rwandans into the 1980s.  These future goals included “achievement and 
maintenance of normal food self‐sufficiency, development of infrastructure to 
improve delivery of essential services and off‐farm employment opportunities, 
establish a viable system of storage and marketing of basic crops and protection of 
natural resources.”46  Because USAID was involved in the beginning stages of key 
sector development programs, the USAID program in Rwanda was not predicted to 
change dramatically for the next three to five years into the mid‐1980s.  But with 
declining economic conditions in Rwanda and changes in the political leadership of 
the United States, U.S. foreign assistance policy would take another turn.  
                                                        
46 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual…FY 1982,” 5. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Economic Instability and the Reagan Era 
  While 1962 and 1973 marked years where changes in both Rwanda and the 
U.S. transpired nearly simultaneously – the creation of USAID and Rwandan 
independence; the New Directions Mandate and Rwanda’s military coup – political 
and ideological shifts affecting aid during the 1980s in the two countries were 
separated by several years.  Apart from this difference, all three decades and shifts 
did share the main characteristic that the ramifications of these signal events took 
years to emerge, demonstrating the long and complicated process of development 
work.  The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 altered the direction of American 
foreign policy and USAID’s mission away from a needs mandate.  Like most changes 
of administration, the new focus took time to be cultivated and implemented in 
Rwanda.  This is evident from the new programs that emerged in Rwanda 
throughout the decade.  Growing economic instability in the 1980s also led to an 
eventual collapse of the Rwandan market in 1986.  After investigating the events in 
the United States and Rwanda, an analysis of USAID documents and project reports 
in Rwanda during the 1980s will show how these events influenced development 
policy and practice.   
 
  During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. “aid for development ha[d] alternated 
between an emphasis on promoting growth – through economic reforms, 
infrastructure expansion, business service centers – and addressing problems of 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poverty directly, for example, by expanding basic health and education.”1  By the 
time Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980, the U.S. was returning to policy 
reforms that focused on fiscal policy and supply‐side economics rather than state 
interventionist policy.  The return to a free market focus differed from the initial 
programs in the 1960s that assisted the newly founded country to stabilize after 
decolonization.  Reagan’s “main interest was the Cold War, and he used foreign aid 
to directly promote U.S. security interests.”2  Included with the reemergence of 
security issues and economic goals, USAID began to narrow and reduce the goals 
promoted through the New Directions Mandate.   
The excitement of increased aid in the 1970s led to a variety of new projects 
in Rwanda and, as the 1980s progressed, USAID began to narrow on the more 
crucial and pressing problems, such as agricultural production and demographics.  
USAID not only focused in on specific areas for projects, but also worked to continue 
the most effective and worthwhile approaches.  The narrowed scope of these 
projects did continue initiatives from the New Directions Mandate, but they also 
indirectly, and occasionally directly, affected the economic and security programs 
proposed by Reagan.  These goals were met through  
an integrated assistance program focusing on free market principles, private 
sector dialogues, and technical assistance projects which promote 
agricultural production, natural resource management, family planning, 
small and medium enterprises and human resource development training.3 
 
                                                        
1 Carol Lancaster, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (Washington D.C.: 
Center for Global Development, 2008, 48.  
2 Samuel Butterfield, U.S. Development Aid: An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the 
Twentieth Century, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 199.  
3 USAID/Rwanda, “Briefing Book,” April 1990, 1. 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The benefits and end products of the continued selected New Directions projects 
implicitly supported the new economic goals of USAID.  For example, the increased 
agricultural output following new farming techniques taught by USAID also led to 
more crops to sell and trade in USAID market projects.  In the 1980s, these 
continuing projects did not receive headline attention, but were consistently 
discussed in USAID documents, as shown later in the chapter.  
  While U.S. foreign aid ideology shifted towards liberalism in the 1980s, the 
continuation of basic human needs projects in Rwanda also demonstrated the 
realities of aid on the ground.  Rwanda is a prime example of the duality of foreign 
aid, an example that demonstrated both the ideology and actuality of development.  
In each decade studied, the broad themes of U.S. foreign aid can be seen, from 
modernization in the 1960s to the needs mandate of the 1970s.  Despite the shift 
towards free market policies in the 1980s, projects working to improve basic human 
needs show the reality of aid in recipient countries.  Because Rwanda was small and 
strategically unimportant, aid workers on the ground used their discretion to 
continue projects necessary to Rwandan development, regardless of the directions 
given in Washington.  
  The new Republican platform set the tone for Reagan’s approach to U.S. 
foreign assistance.  While many projects from the past continued into the 1980s, 
programs with similar goals continued to be created, including agricultural support 
and family planning initiatives.  In the last years of the Carter Administration and 
continuing during both of Reagan’s terms, assistance policy “moved away from basic 
human needs and toward more security domination and the move away from 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security toward a policy of greater economic cooperation.”4  Essentially, the Reagan 
administration’s “foreign assistance objectives in Africa [included] fostering 
economic development through financing projects or balance‐of‐payments support 
conditioned on policy reforms, and providing humanitarian relief.”5  These 
objectives were fiscal, supply‐side concerns associated with market reforms and 
were paired with improving the private sector and business opportunities in both 
Africa and Rwanda.   
  The policy shift represented both the changing needs in recipient countries 
and long‐term U.S. goals.  The strengthening of Cold War rhetoric added to increased 
security concerns and economic objectives combining Rwandan needs and U.S. 
concerns.  As Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense for Kennedy and Johnson 
described, “security is development.  Without development there can be no security. 
A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure.”6 
Preventing the spread of communism to the developing world was a continued and 
increased security interest for Reagan.  While this was primarily a U.S. concern, 
American policy makers justified it as defending democracy and capitalism for 
Rwanda.  Development aid in the 1980s “shifted back to supporting growth and 
emphasized funding of essential economic reforms” to help private investment rise 
and lead to faster growth, “as opposed to poverty alleviation during the 1970s.”7  
                                                        
4 Butterfield, 145.  
5 Butterfield, 127.  
6 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 201.  
7 Carol Lancaster, Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the Twenty­First 
Century, (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 19. 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 The shift in the United States toward economic conditionality began because 
of the growing international debt crisis.  In the late 1970s, the Rwandan economy 
improved because tea, coffee, and cocoa prices tripled between 1975 and 1977.  
Drought in India and frosts in Brazil benefitted African exporters including Kenya, 
Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.8  By the early 1980s, however, growth was slowing 
as Asian and American crops recovered and “export revenues declined, import costs 
rose, and budgets increased, and governments found themselves seriously strapped 
for cash.”9  Facing severe economic crises, many African governments, including the 
Rwandan government, sought increased aid and debt relief.  The general pattern 
was also that poor countries, such as Rwanda, took out loans to continue investing 
in basic needs projects, which led to further indebtedness.  Following 
Habyarimana’s 1970s campaign to increase Rwandan development, the government 
was forced to borrow more money to continue their own projects, fund new offices, 
and create new departments.  These pleas were met with the latest shift in U.S. 
foreign policy directed specifically at economic concerns.   
  While recognizing the important shift toward market liberalism in American 
foreign policy objectives, an examination of the situation leading to the economic 
downfalls of the 1980s in Rwanda is also necessary.  During the 1970s, Rwanda had 
a smaller, more reasonable reliance on aid, but by the 1980s this dependence had 
grown enormously.  The economic collapse resulting from many crop and market 
failures in Rwanda led to a decade of uncertainty and hardships.  As export monies 
                                                        
8 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to do, So Little Done, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), 24.  
9 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 26. 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dried up, Rwanda began borrowing heavily.  The Rwandan government had started 
multiple development projects during the 1970s following President Habyarimana’s 
declaration to improve living conditions across the country.  With many large new 
programs beginning in the early 1980s, the government was forced to borrow 
money to continue domestic development, specifically in the rural sectors of 
Rwanda.  
There were consistent increases in food production in Rwanda from the 
1960s through the early 1980s, but by 1985 production began to stagnate.  Although 
growth remained at a reasonable rate, “between the mid‐1970s and the 1980s the 
combination of a drought and a decrease in international demand left Rwanda with 
a heavy debt burden.”10  The price of coffee, Rwanda’s main export crop, had fallen 
since 1977, “then rose again after 1980 before finally collapsing in 1986.”11  This 
inconsistency was the primary cause of Rwanda’s economic collapse, despite 
increased USAID economic projects in the country.  The economic crises were first 
agricultural before becoming financial. 
There were more factors affecting Rwanda’s financial problems than simply 
plummeting coffee prices.  While coffee was Rwanda’s chief export, the country also 
suffered from failing tea and foodstuffs prices, along with troubles in the tin and 
aluminum mining sectors.  By 1985, tea exports lost up to forty percent of their 
value, which compounded the declining prices of coffee.  The decrease in food 
                                                        
10 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 2002), 53.  
11 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (New York: Columbia Press, 
1995), 84.  
60 
 
production appeared even more drastic than the situation with tea and coffee in 
global markets.  Peter Uvin aptly describes the declining production, 
Maize production fell from 110,00 tons in 1983 to 90,000 by 1986 and 
subsequently stagnated [at the] 90,000 to 100,000 [ton] range. Similarly, 
sorghum production, which was at 213,000 tons in 1982, slid erratically 
downward to approximately 140,00 tons in 1988 and 1989. Over the period 
1984 to 1991, kilocalories produced by Rwandan farmers dropped from 
2,055 per person per day to 1,509.12 
 
These changes decreased from an already low level of production to an intolerably 
minimal amount.  As most Rwandans were farmers, their personal incomes were 
affected by the decrease in agricultural production.  The slump also affected 
Rwandans who were not farmers but faced inflation, poor market prices for other 
trade items, and increased unemployment.  This conjunction contributed to an 
agricultural emergency.  
  The agricultural and economic collapse that affected Rwanda was as much 
tied to natural forces as it was to market declines.  A 1984 drought was followed by 
excessive rain in 1987 and plant disease in 1988.  Paired with these natural changes, 
increased land pressure, soil erosion and poverty compounded the situation.13  
Increasing population rates in Rwanda, already the most densely populated country 
in Africa, did not help.  But the agricultural calamities listed don’t provide the full 
explanation for Rwanda’s economic problems, as the “collapse of the mining sector, 
together with the fall in coffee prices, brought about a new, more severe crisis.”14   
                                                        
12 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (Hartford: Kumarian 
Press, 1998), 54.  
13 Uvin, 57.  
14 Uvin, 57. 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Following the collapse of coffee prices, world tin prices fell and led to the 
closing of Rwanda’s mines.  The companies in charge of Rwanda’s other mineral 
exports, including cassiterite and bauxite,15 closed their production and further 
deprived Rwandans of revenue.  The collapse of these crops and markets led to tens 
of thousands of unemployed young men without future job prospects.  It was this 
situation that USAID attempted to combat.  While Rwanda ultimately suffered an 
economic meltdown, the efforts of USAID may have alleviated some suffering.  The 
collapse demonstrated how desperately Rwanda needed help from organizations 
like USAID.  
 
  Along with demonstrating what crucial social development programs 
continued from the 1970s into the 1980s, USAID documents also show the shifting 
goals toward market initiatives of the 1980s.  As outlined by the USAID report on 
the history of its involvement in Rwanda, during 1980 the overall mission 
development goals were to “increase per capita food production and effect a general 
improvement in the health status of the Rwandan family, while bringing the 
demographic problem in balance with development potential.”16  USAID could more 
easily roll over projects started in the 1970s, but projects focusing specifically on 
the evolving economic downturn took longer to be created and implemented.  Along 
with the ease of continuing basic needs programs, USAID workers in Rwanda 
recognized the need to maintain projects from the 1970s despite the changed 
                                                        
15 Cassiterite is a reddish, brownish or yellowing mineral containing tin dioxide. It is the 
main ore of tin.  Bauxite is a clayey rock that is the chief commercial ore of aluminum.  
16 Lynn Elizabeth Grosz, “A History of the USAID Program in Rwanda 1962‐1985.” (Kigali, 
Rwanda, 1986), unpublished report available at USAID DEC, 17.  
62 
 
ideology in Washington.  Multiple projects demonstrated how USAID continued to 
tackle the areas of increased interest from the 1970s.   
  Beginning with projects to improve family health, USAID teamed with 
organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to address diseases afflicting 
children worldwide.  Rwanda was one of the first countries to be included in the 
program Combatting (sic) Communicable Childhood Diseases (CCCD) that began in 
1979 to fight several basic illnesses faced by children.  By the first months of 1980, 
the Centers for Disease Control in coordination with USAID began the Expanded 
Program for Immunizations.  This program, with support and funding from CCCD, 
worked to “immunize children under five against measles, diphtheria, tetanus, 
pertussis, tuberculosis and polio.”17  Providing crucial services and materials, USAID 
was an integral part of this program’s success.  The vaccines were administered 
through local dispensaries but needed to remain cold until injection.  USAID 
provided the cold chain materials that kept the medicine refrigerated from the 
manufacturer until they were locally dispensed.18  
  In May 1988, an external evaluation team produced the “Rwanda CCCD End 
of Project Evaluation.”  This extensive document outlined the key goals, projects 
implemented, and their success and failure rates for the eight years the project ran.  
This project was intended  
to strengthen institutional support for these interventions by developing an 
effective, simplified health information system, strengthen established 
training and health information efforts, reinforce systems of supervision, 
                                                        
17 Grosz, 18.  
18 Grosz, 18. 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support operations research and other studies, and encourage the 
development of self‐financing mechanisms.19 
 
These goals were clearly seen throughout many of the programs implemented, most 
specifically in the Expanded Program for Immunization in Rwanda.  
The report explains the end results for the Expanded Program for 
Immunizations, with the success rates for each disease targeted.  The tuberculosis 
vaccine provided increased coverage from 49 percent in 1983 to 90 percent in 
1987; the diphtheria‐pertussis‐tetanus vaccine coverage increased from 36 percent 
to 79 percent; trivalent oral polio vaccine went from 25 percent to almost 80 
percent; and measles prevention went from 53 percent coverage to 75.20  These 
increases in the number of immunizations given, though they unfortunately did not 
eliminate the diseases entirely, did have a major impact on development in Rwanda.  
By significantly reducing the number of people susceptible to these ailments, 
Rwanda and other health organizations were able to focus on other more persistent 
afflictions, such as malaria and newly emerging diseases like HIV/AIDS.21   
The results above were presented in USAID documents and may contain a 
certain amount of bias, but the CCCD program operated around the globe and had 
significant success outside of Rwanda as well.  According to the World Health 
Organization, by 1988 “polio cases worldwide decreased by over 99 percent and 
only four countries retain polio,” not including Rwanda.22  While this is one disease, 
                                                        
19 Thomas Bossert, “Rwanda CCCD End of Project Evaluation,” May 1988, 7.  
20 Bossert, “Rwanda CCCD,” 9.  
21 Bossert, “Rwanda CCCD,” 9. 
22 Sam Okiror, “World Health Organization, Africa: Polio eradication,” 
http://www.afro.who.int/en/rwanda/rwanda‐publications/bulletins/1932‐polio‐eradication.html 
(accessed March 10, 2011). 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it supports the fact that rates of diseases were declining with health campaigns, 
including the Expanded Program for Immunizations in Rwanda.  Related to health 
concerns, USAID also continued to work on demographic problems in Rwanda.  
While it may appear paradoxical to reduce disease rates in the most densely 
populated country in Africa, ultimately the end result of both health programs and 
demographic projects were complimentary.  In the short run, diminished infection 
rates did increase pressure on scarce resources, however, improving the health of 
Rwandans eventually led to lower birth rates, positively affecting demographics.  By 
implementing health and demographic programs at the same time, retention of 
population growth improved.  
  Population growth rates became a major concern for the United States 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but were not acknowledged by developing regions 
until the 1980s.  In 1981, USAID began a major long‐term bilateral project with the 
Government of Rwanda to establish a National Office of Population.  The decree was 
approved in September 1980, after years of Rwandan denial of a growing 
population issue, and the National Population Office was created in the following 
year.  The project helped create methods to collect population data and 
subsequently analyze and evaluate the research.  The Office began “carrying out 
studies of the problems affecting the growth of the population, evaluat[ing] the 
importance of these problems and propos[ing] solutions.”23  The data collected by 
the new office helped Rwanda develop methods to curtail growth rates with 
guidance and support from USAID.  USAID brought demographics issues to the 
                                                        
23 USAID/Rwanda, “Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1983,” January 1981, 40. 
65 
 
government’s attention, provided evidence, supported Rwanda’s own Population 
Office, and eventually made Rwanda capable of addressing and solving their own 
demographic problems.   
  Practices to curb population growth and improve maternal and child health 
care continued in several projects through to the start of the 1990s.  Plans 
established during the final years of the 1980s lay out the Family Planning II project.  
The main goal of this project was to reduce fertility rates, but also worked to 
improve the health and survival rates of children and thereby encourage parents to 
have fewer children.  By teaching preventative healthcare and encouraging 
Rwandans to have more wanted and planned pregnancies, this project fell in line 
with Reagan’s enforcement of the Mexico City policy.  While the Mexico City policy 
required all organizations (state and non‐governmental) that received federal 
funding to refrain from performing or promoting abortion services, the Family 
Planning II project worked to reduce fertility rates by preventing unwanted 
pregnancies, not aborting them.  Working from and expanding on evidence and 
materials provided in previous maternal and child health care programs and 
demographic projects, the Family Planning II program’s base “for policy making was 
improved because of better quality, timeliness and utilization of family planning 
statistics.”24  The variety in these approaches allowed USAID to teach better health 
practices and support Rwanda in establishing their own strategy for tackling 
population pressures.   
                                                        
24 USAID/Rwanda, “Action Plan: FY 1990‐1991,” May 1989, 7.  
66 
 
  Development of agricultural production complimented demographic 
concerns and the aim to improve Rwandans health.  In March 1979, the possibility 
of administering a survey and analysis of agriculture in Rwanda was first proposed, 
and resulted in the USAID Agricultural Education Project.  The Rwandan Ministry of 
Agriculture assisted USAID with investigating the yearly food data and production 
rates.  In July 1979, a team of U.S. consultants worked with the Ministry in Rwanda 
to prepare an ‘Outline of a Possible Collaborative Survey and Analysis of Agriculture 
in Rwanda.’  Based on the suggestions from the research team, a series of small 
projects were designed to help improve and increase production, training, and data 
collection.25  There were many other projects based in agricultural production that 
coincided with the early 1980s.  
  In June 1981, the Budget Submission Report for FY 1983 outlined another 
agricultural project set to start by the end of 1983.  The purpose of this project 
transferred “the results of relevant agricultural research to the farm level in selected 
regions, and test[ed] the feasibility of valley land agricultural production.”26  During 
the 1970s, food production in Rwanda had stagnated due to increased population 
pressures.  With the assistance of the Rwandan government, which provided 
personnel and operational support, small farmers were the focus for direct benefits 
with new agricultural technologies.  The aim was for Rwandan families to have more 
food available and improve the health of the population (including fertility rates) by 
improving small farm production.  
                                                        
25 Grosz, 19‐20.  
26 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1983,” June 1981, 7‐8. 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 Other projects worked to improve the amount of food available to Rwandan 
farmers and increase their daily food intake.  These projects began in the 1970s and 
continued into the 1980s.  The Food Storage and Marketing program, discussed in 
depth in chapter two, had a large impact on farm production.  Stemming from the 
Food Storage and Marketing program, the Local Crop Storage Program also 
supported the efforts to protect crops and help small farmers protect their produce 
from rodents and rot.  Lastly, the Fish Culture Program worked to reduce the 
amount of farmers plowing overused land, and provided needed nutritional benefits 
of protein and other vitamins into the diets of Rwandans.  With the health programs 
discussed above, USAID agricultural programs helped address health issues and the 
growing population problems in Rwanda.   
  The family health and agricultural programs discussed above indirectly 
demonstrate the new development goals of the 1980s.  Supporting the government 
of Rwanda’s third five‐year development plan with the new initiatives from the 
Reagan administration, these health‐related projects aimed to improve both the 
social and economic conditions of Rwanda.  The four projects that addressed 
immunizations, population control, and family health practices continued into the 
1980s and represented Reagan’s initiatives.  Rwanda’s economic conditions would 
have no chance of survival if the population growth rate was not addressed.  
Immunizing more children, promoting healthier rearing practices and teaching 
improved agricultural methods led to better economic possibilities.  Accompanying 
the basic needs programs that indirectly contributed to the new economic goals of 
the 1980s were programs that directly affected the market reform policies.  The 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Maternal Child Health/Family Planning II Project, for example, provided “funds for 
private sector family planning delivery services.”27  By continuing basic needs 
programs through private sector organizations, the goals of the 1970s also directly 
supported the new initiatives of the 1980s.  
The initiatives behind these projects demonstrate the changed USAID 
directives of the 1980s from the 1970s.  With the New Directions Mandate in the 
1970s, these health practices were have been geared toward improving the living 
conditions in Rwanda.  While the projects in the 1980s still achieved the same 
outcome, improving the basic needs of the rural poor, the motivation behind these 
projects differed.  In the 1980s, USAID worked to achieve economic reforms; and 
without addressing the problems of a sickly populace and uncontrollable population 
growth, the economic conditions in Rwanda would not have been able to improve.  
  Although agriculture continued to be important, USAID’s main focus in 
Rwanda during the 1980s turned to market reforms.  While the projects discussed 
above did not directly affect the economic conditions in Rwanda, they had a large 
indirect impact.  The capability of Rwandans to increase agricultural outputs and 
improve economic possibilities was encouraged by controlling the population 
growth rates and improving rural health.  The principal causes of poverty and 
constraints to development of any kind include “population pressures, low level 
agricultural production, and limited trained manpower.”28  USAID began more 
directly addressing the material improvements of Rwandans’ lives and worked to 
increase economic activity throughout the 1980s.  
                                                        
27 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1991,” May 1989, 20.  
28 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1984,” June 1982, 2. 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 In 1983, USAID readjusted its main development goals in accordance with 
changes in the situation within Rwanda.  The year before, in 1982 Rwanda released 
its third five year plan for development, working to “satisfy the food needs of the 
population; promote better use of the country’s human resources; improve the 
living conditions of the population; and improve Rwanda’s position vis à vis the 
exterior.”29  The new USAID strategies expanded upon and worked with the latest 
Rwandan development plan for 1982‐1986.  By 1985, USAID’s strategies were fine‐
tuned to address four primary U.S. concerns: “policy reforms that decentralize 
administrative structures, rely on free market forces and limited population growth 
rates; private enterprise development; technology transfer and research; and 
institutional development.”30  By combining the new USAID goals and Rwandan 
initiatives, projects working to improve the daily lives of Rwandans continued while 
newly developed economic programs were implemented. 
  USAID enacted several economic policy programs throughout the 1980s, but 
there was one primary project that began in 1985.  USAID and Rwanda signed the 
Policy Reform Initiatives in Manufacturing and Employment (PRIME) agreement to 
“support Rwandan efforts to make necessary structural adjustments and policy 
changes in order to stimulate production and employment in the manufacturing 
sector.”31  Essentially, PRIME was a policy reform project that sought to change 
Rwanda’s policy in favor of private sector development.  This project combined the 
new economic initiatives of USAID and continued the social developments outlined 
                                                        
29 Grosz, 23. 
30 Grosz, 23. 
31 Grosz, 38. 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by the Rwandan government.  Because of a small economic crisis in Rwanda during 
1983 to 1984, PRIME worked to help the country recover and make improvements 
for the future.32 
The project consisted of different parts, including financial support for 
technical assistance and administering specific studies.  These studies included 
looking at industrial incentives and analyses of household budgets.  Other objectives 
included improving agricultural technologies and services to maternal and child 
health, including family planning, and encouraging economic growth and on‐farm 
employment opportunities.  All these objectives shaped “incentives for agricultural 
producers, … the demographic problem, and … the role of the private sector in the 
economy.”33  USAID and the Rwandan government continued to work together 
through the PRIME project to improve overall economic conditions for the country. 
An update on PRIME’s progress was provided in the “Action Plan for FY 
1990‐1991,” written in May 1989.  The private sector was used to increase rural per 
capita incomes, and had been making real progress.  Through the objective to 
increase general rural employment, USAID and the Rwandan government made 
several policy changes allowing for conditions more favorable for the private sector.  
One example included a “redirection from privatization of state‐owned enterprises 
to emphasizing small and medium enterprises.”34  With yearly checks, PRIME 
remained on target, and made small adjustments along the way that continued into 
the 1990s.   
                                                        
32 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1988,” May 1986, iii.  
33 Grosz, 39.  
34 USAID/Rwanda, “Acton Plan: FY 1990‐1991,” 3. 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PRIME was a perfect example of a market reform project that also considered 
how social development concerns could affect their economic goals.  Many of the 
other programs employed during the 1980s did not take as many issues into 
account; negative market predictions for the future that influenced other economic 
programs more heavily.  For example, in January 1981 when the “Country 
Development Strategy Statement for FY 1983” was being written, USAID workers 
were worried for Rwanda’s economic future. Rwanda’s economy was almost 
completely dependent on the agricultural sector that provided almost ninety 
percent of the population with its livelihood.  Agriculture’s “share of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) had fallen from 76 percent in 1964 to 49 percent in 1976 
and was expected to fall further to 40 percent in 1980.”35  This made prospects for 
1980 unfavorable.   
Predictions for the other areas of production in Rwanda were also 
pessimistic.  The growth predicted in GDP was not expected to cover the population 
growth rate for the proceeding years as well as decline in agricultural production 
resulting from poor weather conditions.  The development of the agriculture sector 
“has received paramount consideration in the economic development strategy, with 
the government’s overriding objectives being to attain relative self‐sufficiency in 
foodstuffs.”36  USAID recognized falling tea and coffee prices as a potential for 
economic disaster. Coffee production in 1980 was projected to fall 21 percent to 
21,400 tons from the previous year.  Other crops had also been falling, including 
                                                        
35 USAID/Rwanda, “Development Strategy: FY 1983,” 1. 
36 USAID/Rwanda, “Development Strategy: FY 1983,” 1. 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pyrethrum and cinchona (quinine).37  The debt‐service ratio38 was also increasing in 
1980, from 1.3 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 1980 and a forecast of 4.0 percent 
in 1981.39  Rwanda had borrowed money to fund its development projects and keep 
the country running as the GDP fell.  All of these factors were creating a worsening 
picture for Rwanda.  
USAID created new financial aid programs to address issues with the 
worsening economic realities in Rwanda.  In May 1986, the “Annual Budget 
Submission for FY 1988” listed the revised objectives for Rwanda.  Building off 
increasing per capita food production and improving Rwandan families health 
statuses, USAID added “increasing employment and income especially of the rural 
population through the promotion of private enterprise and increase agricultural 
production by raising the productivity and profitability of farming,”40 to the list of 
goals.  USAID created dozens of projects in Rwanda by the mid‐1980s and the 
organization learned that by dedicating more time to researching and 
understanding the situation in Rwanda, projects were more likely to succeed by 
USAID terms.  Since the United States was “viewed as one of the leaders in 
promoting institutional reforms needed to implement economic policy change,” the 
projects aimed to help Rwanda recover had to be well planned.41   
                                                        
37 USAID/Rwanda, “Development Strategy: FY 1983,” 3.  
38 In economics and government finance, debt service ratio refers to the ratio of debt service 
payments (principal plus interest) of a country to their export earnings. A country’s finances are 
healthier when the ratio is lower. 
39 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1984,” 3.  
40 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1988,” iii. 
41 USAID/Rwanda, “Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1989,” March 1987, 35. 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Beginning in the late 1980s, USAID began two programs focused on 
enterprise development, one private and the other rural, both quintessential 
interests of market reform – promoting entrepreneurship, private enterprise, and 
policy reforms favorable to markets.  The Private Enterprise Development project 
had two targets.  The first target was to provide reinforced management, financial 
and marketing skills to small and medium enterprises.  This entailed hiring trained 
employees in the private sector and offering twenty seminars for on‐the‐job 
training.  The second target was to identify appropriate technologies for the rural 
area.  While ‘appropriate technologies’ was a 1970s basic needs buzzword, the idea 
behind finding technology best suited for developing regions continued with new 
development trends.  An example provided of appropriate technology included 
installing sunflower mills in different cooperatives.  The Rural Enterprise 
Development program identified new opportunities for rural investments.  This 
project increased the involvement of non‐governmental organizations (NGO) in 
private enterprise development and offered courses in accounting and feasibility 
studies to help make rural employees more desirable.42  NGOs were promoted 
during both the 1970s and 1980s, but for different reasons.  The basic needs 
mandate of the 1970s saw NGOs as more local, closer to the poor, and smaller; but 
the 1980s reformers viewed them as non‐state, private organizations.  
Outlined in 1989, USAID began a Local Currency program that worked to 
increase private sector economic growth in the rural provinces of Rwanda.  Support 
                                                        
42 USAID/Rwanda, “Acton Plan: FY 1990‐1991,” 17. 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from this project provided over 850,000 U.S. dollars43 for rural infrastructure.  Rural 
infrastructure included centers for artisans, small producers and cooperative 
members.  Almost 700,000 dollars were given to support rural artisans and youth 
groups.  This support came in the form of training on management principles, 
entrepreneurship, and cooperative development.  440,000 dollars were given for 
Rwandans working in small industries to receive training and study tours.  Finally, 
almost 100,000 dollars were provided to finance training activities for women, with 
another 65,000 for credit available to participating women.44   
For FY 1990, the Rwandan government redirected emphasis from 
privatization to support for small and medium enterprises.  This redirection 
supported USAID strategies to increase productive off‐farm employment 
opportunities.  The USAID strategy continued to support “the private sector through 
providing support directly to the government of Rwanda through [their] private 
sector projects or by financing studies through PRIME.”45  USAID’s private sector 
strategy was designed to complement Rwanda’s privatization plans, so as to 
increase the possibilities for success.   
Rwanda initially launched their privatization efforts in the mid‐1980s, but 
little progress had been made by October 1986 when the government developed a 
draft privatization strategy.  Privatization had been focused toward “improving 
parastatal efficiency,” but following the economic crises attention was focused on 
immediate budget and balance of payment problems.  With the government of 
                                                        
43 All subsequent discussions of funds will be in U.S. dollars.  
44 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1991,” 15‐16. 
45 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1991,” 20. 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Rwanda’s attention diverted, USAID worked to begin privatizing small sectors 
including nurseries, bakeries and fisheries.  Fortunately, progress was made under 
PRIME, “where the government of Rwanda show[ed] stronger interests in 
promoting the private sector in key areas such as tourism, transport, education and 
trade.”  Following USAID’s lead, Rwanda planned to improve the “business 
investment climate by easing restrictions and administrative procedures for new 
firms.”46   
One final economic project designed in the late 1980s included another Rural 
Enterprise Development Project (while this project had the same name as a 
previous project, it was a distinct program).  Five million dollars were designated 
for dispersal by FY 1992 to help create productive rural employment.  According to 
the report, “the Cooperative Training and the Private Enterprise projects ha[d] 
shown that small and medium enterprises, when given assistance, training and 
credit, can increase productivity and member’s per capita income and stimulate 
rural investment.”47  The Rural Enterprise Development project built on the success 
of these two past projects with technical assistance and training for both rural men 
and women.   
The economic development projects described represent the direct methods 
USAID employed in the 1980s.  While the social projects continued from the 1970s 
indirectly helped economic conditions, the programs of the 1980s actively worked 
to help private, public, and rural development.  It took years for the Rwandan 
                                                        
46 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1990,” 26.  
47 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual … FY 1991,” 47. 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economy to collapse, and years for USAID to create more appropriate programs to 
address these failing conditions.  But with the new directions from Reagan, the 
economic mindset was ready in USAID to help Rwanda recover.  
While USAID continued the most important basic needs programs in Rwanda 
from the 1970s, these projects also contributed to the new focus on market reform.  
USAID’s increased focus on Rwandan economic growth during the 1980s began with 
the election of President Reagan providing the American stimulus and inconsistent 
commodity prices on Rwanda’s exports, thus providing the Rwandan stimulus.  With 
a refocus on economic and market issues from USAID and a new crucial need for 
financial assistance in Rwanda, these two shifts worked in tandem to address the 
problems of the 1980s.   
 
 
Conclusion   
In 1990, after the country’s economic collapse, the Rwandan government 
signed a structural adjustment program (SAP) with the World Bank to address the 
country’s continued financial decline.  Initially Rwanda resisted signing the SAP 
because of the stipulations attached to the agreement, but with years of pressure 
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adjust its economic 
position finally, the Rwandan government agreed in 1990.  These provisions 
included many fundamental structural changes to the Rwandan government.  
Rwanda received $90 million in SAP loans to promote fiscal and monetary 
discipline.  The goals of the SAP included boosting coffee exports, reducing imports, 
and devaluing the Rwandese franc. 1  While the IMF and World Bank began handling 
Rwanda’s economic recovery, the United States refocused USAID projects to reflect 
the latest shifts.  
  Three major events in the early 1990s dramatically affected USAID’s policies 
in Rwanda.  First, a stipulation that accompanied the structural adjustment program 
required that Rwanda would become a multiparty democracy in 1990.  Second, 
almost immediately following this change, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), 
comprised of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990.  
This marked the beginning of a four‐year civil war, eventually leading to genocide.  
Third, the end of the Cold War in 1991 significantly transformed U.S. foreign policy.  
These shifts guided USAID projects to expand democracy in Rwanda.  
                                                        
1 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (Hartford: Kumarian 
Press, 1998), 58. 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 The Annual Budget Submission FY 1993, written June 1991, explained the 
changing situation in Rwanda and the new USAID goals for democratization.  The 
USAID team “decided that the time [was] right for increased U.S. activities in 
support of the democratization process.”2  The objectives for these new projects 
included support for improved governance and strengthening local administrative 
structures.  While there are other examples, the following project shows a general 
approach of USAID’s support for Rwanda’s transition.  
  The Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project Identification Document 
Outline from April 1992 describes the progressing democratization of Rwanda with 
USAID’s assistance.  The new Democratic Initiatives and Governance project worked 
to “produce a new social contract in Rwanda through which all the Rwandan people 
share equitably in the processes of democratic self‐governance, peacefully enjoy 
basic freedom and justice.”3  This project reflected a new type of USAID programs 
designed to promote Rwandan democratization before the 1994 genocide.  
 
USAID’s objectives in Rwanda during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were 
impacted by clear, discernable political, social, and economic changes.  These 
changes represent the evolving development ideology of U.S. foreign policy from 
modernization theory, to a needs mandate, and later, market liberalization.  During 
1962, President Kennedy created USAID and Rwanda formally declared 
independence.  1973 saw the adoption of the New Directions Mandate months after 
                                                        
2 USAID/Rwanda, “Annual Budget Submission: FY 1993,” June 1991, 52.  
3 Harlan Hobgood and Thomas Kelly, “Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project 
Identification Document Outline (USAID/Rwanda Project No. 696‐0130),” April 1992, 4‐5. 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Juvenal Habyarimana led a military coup in Rwanda and took power.  During the 
1980s, President Reagan placed a new emphasis on the free market and security 
interests that coincided with financial crises in Rwanda.  Shifts continued into the 
1990s.   
  To understand why these shifts occurred, one must examine trends and 
events in Rwanda and the United States between the 1960s and the 1990s.  Glenn 
Slocum, a former USAID employee, summarized the changing interests of U.S. 
foreign aid policies:    
The sixties were the time of industrial development, with the rush for 
technical assistance development projects. The ‘70s, we were called to help 
the developing world to meet basic human needs. The eighties brought a 
recognition that we had to pay more attention to the private sector as the 
engine of development in most countries. This coincided with a conservative 
Republican administration.4 
 
Slocum’s outline demonstrates the reactionary quality of development assistance in 
the past, explaining that many of the policies enacted addressed consequences of 
earlier programs.  Continually correcting unforeseen problems associated with past 
policies lends to an appearance of ineffectiveness.  Because donor countries fixated 
on problems created by their policies instead of the inherent problems within 
recipient countries, aid’s effectiveness was limited.  By studying the history of 
development assistance, policymakers can learn from some of these successes and 
failures.  
  Despite the appearance of inefficient programs, foreign assistance has made 
some positive impacts on development.  As Hariadene Johnson, a former USAID 
                                                        
4 Ambassador Glenn Slocum, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, 18 
November 1998, 121. 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employee explained, USAID programs “really worked in Rwanda and had in many 
ways an impact upon the country; a promising future.”5  While this perspective is 
useful, it only provides one side of the story.  Historical analysis is needed from both 
the American and Rwandan perspectives to fully assess the successes and failures of 
development aid.  
  Equally important to a more complete study of development aid in Rwanda is 
scholarship independent of the 1994 genocide.  Academics that approach Rwandan 
history from a linear perspective culminating in the genocide fundamentally 
simplify the country’s diverse past.  Scholars taking this approach, including Jan 
Vansina, Mahmood Mamdani, and Peter Uvin, present a deterministic view of 
Rwandan history.  The purpose of these academic works is to trace the origins of the 
genocide not understand the full breadth of Rwanda’s past.  As a result, they often 
miss broader implications of their topics.  African historian Jan Vansina wrote his 
book Antecedents to Modern Rwanda in an effort to correct terms of tribal violence 
touted by the media.  While his work looks at ancient Rwandan history ending in 
1900, his intention centers on better understanding the genocide.  Anthropologist 
Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers explains how the effects of 
colonialism contributed to the growing ethnic violence that led to the genocide.  And 
political scientist Peter Uvin’s Aiding Violence traces how international development 
aid was a factor in the increasing structural violence within Rwanda, eventually 
contributing to the genocide.  While understanding the roles that these topics played 
in the genocide’s formation is crucial and the analysis of the Rwandan genocide is 
                                                        
5 Ambassador Hariadene Johnson, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, 8 
September 1998, 165. 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important, the sole focus on violence simplifies the complexity of Rwanda’s history.  
This thesis contributes to the formation of a broader understanding of Rwandan 
history.  
  Though a small, seemingly insignificant country, Rwanda’s history is 
important in many rights.  New scholarship adding to the incomplete literature on 
the history of Rwanda, independent of the genocide, works to reinterpret its image.  
Rwanda needs to reclaim its image as a diverse country since the West has used it as 
an example, symbol, and warning of the opposite.  Initially the “poster child” of 
development, Rwanda was touted as the “Switzerland of Africa” by donor nations, 
but in the wake of the genocide Rwanda was used as an example of the barbaric 
nature of Africans.  Other countries are warned to avoid becoming “the next 
Rwanda.”  This stereotype is perpetuated in the coverage of African conflicts today.  
Australian Journalist Dan McDougall’s article “Echoes of Rwanda in Ivory Coast 
Killing Fields,” draws connections between the Rwandan genocide and the violence 
occurring in the Ivory Coast.6  New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, reporting 
on the Libyan civil war commented that “if the Libya operation is successful, it may 
help the emerging doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ – a landmark notion in 
international law… that might help avert the next Rwanda.”7  This thesis works to 
disrupt this simplifying discourse by reinterpreting Rwandan history independent 
of the genocide.  
                                                        
6 Dan McCougall, “Echoes of Rwanda in Ivory Coast Killing Fields,” The Australian Sunday 
Times, April 11, 2011.  
7 Nicholas Kristof, “Learning from Pervious Mistakes,” North Adams Transcript (MA), April 4, 
2011. 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As demonstrated, U.S. foreign policy changed during each decade between 
1962 and the 1990s, reflecting political, economic, and social shifts within Rwanda 
and America.  USAID/Rwanda programs illustrate the United States’ changing 
development ideology, but also the dissonant realities of implementing aid ‘on the 
ground.’  While development philosophy shifted in the U.S., USAID continued to 
implement programs necessary for Rwandan development.  These shifts can be 
identified and examined through USAID project reports that reveal the reasons 
behind new goals and programs.  The historical study of development aid is needed 
to help contextualize past programs, but also make foreign policy aid more effective 
for the future.  With too many generalities, development policies become less 
efficient. By creating more specific programs with tailored policies to each recipient 
country, development aid can become more effective. 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